

Nerijus Milerius

A TOPOGRAPHICAL MAPPING OF LITHUANIAN PHILOSOPHY

Vilniaus universitetas / Vilnius University
Filosofijos fakultetas / Department of Philosophy
Universiteto g. 9/1
LT- 01513 Vilnius
El. paštas / e-mail: nerijus_miler@yahoo.com

Any question concerning the conditions of philosophy has a peculiar status in philosophy. On the one hand, it promises to reveal something that remains unrevealed and unnamed when discussing “ordinary” issues in philosophy. On the other hand, there is a lingering suspicion that the very question indicates philosophy’s sickness rather than vitality. Indeed, reflections on the status of philosophy among the sciences and the humanities seem to intensify in situations of crisis.

Among the texts dealing with the issue in the post-Soviet period are some articles and interviews by Arvydas Šliogeris, Algis Mickūnas, Arūnas Sverdiolas, Tomas Sodeika, Alvydas Jokubaitis, Krescencijus Stoškus, Leonidas Donskis, Gintautas Mažeikis, and Nerija Putinaitė. This is quite a lot considering the torpidity of Lithuanian cultural life in general and of philosophical discourse in particular. Yet this is also too little, since the above-mentioned authors have considered different aspects of cultural life, so that with a few exceptions their ideas have seldom met each other in direct confrontation. Despite differences in focus the texts fall into two groups. Both seem to be prompted by a situation of crisis and their difference is the way the crisis is interpreted.

I first present an overview of the two positions and suggest what kind of a topographical map of Lithuanian philosophy they presuppose. The second part of the article is an attempt to describe the discourse of Lithuanian philosophy in a topographical way by identifying the *topoi* (locations) in which those who enter the space of Lithuanian philosophy find themselves.

CRISIS OF TEMPORAL CONTINUITY

The first group, to which I would primarily assign articles by Arvydas Šliogeris, Alvydas Jokubaitis, and Krescencijus Stoškus, is focused on the transition from the Soviet epoch to post-Soviet times. Although these authors consider the issues of the contact between the new Lithuanian philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy, what they are mainly concerned with is the relation between post-Soviet Lithuanian philosophy and its Soviet past.

If we had to reconstruct what these authors consider the topical issue on the condition of philosophy in Lithuania the emphasis would be on the temporality of thinking, i.e. on whether the philosophy of the Soviet period could be positively integrated in the context of post-Soviet philosophy (answered positively by A. Šliogeris and K. Stoškus who put an emphasis on the so called Meškauskas' school of critical thinking) or whether the Soviet period be erased because of its political suppression of thought (as maintained by A. Jokubaitis, especially in his discussion with K. Stoškus).

One can notice that different answers to the question would refer to different time horizons which influence someone theorizing in "here and now" situation. If we assume that the Soviet regime allowed at least some space for critical thinking, then contemporary philosophy surely has to deal with the accumulated resources of such thinking, despite the experienced violence of that period. Just as surely, if the legacy of the Soviet period is denied any value, then it should be ignored or eliminated as an obstacle for independent thought.

The temporal aspect of the issue has an even wider reach, since the attitude towards the Soviet past would also shape the attitude of post-Soviet philosophy towards the pre-war philosophical tradition. Whatever the judgment on Lithuanian philosophy of the Soviet period, it is obvious that Soviet occupation interrupted the course of pre-war Lithuanian philosophy and that with the end of the occupation some ways of restoring relations with the "lost" history had to be found.

When discussing the conditions for philosophical thinking in Lithuania one should beware of the illusion that it could start in an empty space, without a context, however this context is assessed. The context is primarily the past, which cannot be transferred to the new period automatically,

though the hope is that reconstructing what was lost in the past would shift us towards future. The motif of the past, which shifts us towards future, and the future, which rectifies the failures of the past, is also expressed in a recent text on Lithuanian philosophy entitled “Is there philosophy in Lithuania?”:

Suddenly, after getting beyond the forced Marxism and beyond the discourse torn away from reality, one was facing the sad philosophical scene and was impelled by the sight to run away from it as far as possible. In Lithuania today only those workers of philosophy may survive who are able to trim the philosophical field here and there and are capable of learning to walk in its narrow and slowly retrievable spaces. But is there enough of them so that they could meet on an open road some day in distant future, after having accomplished at least a part of such a titanic task? (Putinaitė 2001: 605).

As we can see, when the past which has not fulfilled itself refers to the future which has all expectations fulfilled, the present situation becomes the most problematic. The present is something promised, and yet is absent and delayed. The present is delayed since it is an ideal, not to be identified with present “reality”.

This image of our relation with the past suggests that Lithuanian philosophy “exists” under conditions of an ever-unfulfilled “present”. The most important location on the topographical map of Lithuania is the one where the Soviet past meets the post-Soviet present. The location is not a neutral one; it acts as a magnet, limiting our ability to choose other trajectories of motion. On the other hand, it is often assumed that traversing the location might help to fill up the blank spaces on the map that embrace to a certain degree both the Soviet past and the post-Soviet present, as well as the future.

CRISIS OF SPATIAL CONTINUITY

Alongside the bunch of problems relating to the temporal conditions for philosophy in Lithuania there is another set of problems. They come to the fore whenever it is emphasized that when philosophizing in Lithuania we are not only in the area of own past but also in the area of contemporary Western (as well as Eastern) philosophy.

Probably the most radical diagnosis of the dependence of Lithuanian philosophy on Western (and Eastern) fashions in philosophy is that by Alvydas Jokubaitis:

The traditional Lithuanian situation may be described as follows: any two philosophers in Vilnius today raise an issue, which was already inquired into yesterday by two professors in Paris or Oxford. And this is beyond criticism. The very repetition of a Western inquiry is considered meaningful and

important. Without such a repetition, as it was already noted, Lithuanian philosophy would be inconceivable. One reason to consider the situation strange is that we most often merely repeat Western answers rather than raise Western questions. If the humanities in the West duplicate other sciences (biology, economics, philology), as Michel Foucault complains, we, in Lithuania, as it seems, duplicate the duplicates. (Jokubaitis 1997: 77).

It is obvious that by describing the relation of Lithuanian philosophy to Western/Eastern philosophies in this way Jokubaitis appeals to the scheme of there being a 'center' (Western/Eastern) and a 'periphery' (Lithuania). The scheme also presupposes a mechanics in the development of Lithuanian philosophy – that of the transmission of theories developed at the 'center' to the 'peripheral' Lithuanian context. The 'duplicates' and even more so the 'duplicates of the duplicate' can at best approximately convey the thoughts presented at the 'center'. Thus irrespective of the quality of the work the stigma of being a 'duplicate of the duplicate' is deeply damaging.

The diagnosis of Lithuanian philosophy as mere repetition of primary or even secondary sources is not at all unique. We should be reminded that many Western theories, too, have emerged by 'duplicating'. To recall a joke of Françoise Dastur, professor of Sorbonne and now at university of Nice, who told in a private conversation: "German philosophers reflect, French provide interpretations, and Italians do translations". If we interpret the joke in the framework of the 'duplication' theory we have the following sequence: German philosophy is the source, French philosophy is 'the first wave', still having the ability to interpret things, and finally Italian philosophy, which only reaches the original 'source' in the form of 'mere' translation considered as a nominal transmission from one linguistic region to another.

The 'duplication' theory, interpreted in this way, presupposes just one direction, from 'center' towards 'periphery'. This is a scheme of monologue thinking, which leaves no space for mutuality, i.e. dialogue. However, a different approach to the procedure of repetition is also possible. Using the same example of the relations between German, French, and Italian philosophies we could present an alternative sequence: e.g., the works of the German phenomenologist E. Husserl that are still popular among French philosophers are the 'source', the analysis of Husserl's works performed by the Frenchman M. Merleau-Ponty is an interpretation, and the studies of the German scholar B. Waldenfels on Merleau-Ponty are an interpretation of an interpretation, which correct the original 'source', i.e. the works of Husserl. In this sequence the repetition of the questions and possibly the partial repetition of answers is not a merely mechanic duplication of the source. As Waldenfels once noted, even when we quote we do not merely move ideas from

one text to another, we rather grant a voice to the quoted authors. Given the possibility to 'speak' the quoted authors are no longer treated as divine idols, they become partners in a dialogue.

In view of this alternative to the one-way procedure of repetition the critical charge in the evaluation of Lithuanian philosophy by Alvydas Jukabaitis is even more prominent. The charge is that by repeating the thoughts of Western and Eastern authors Lithuanian philosophy lacks self-sufficiency and originality. Lithuanian philosophers reflect under conditions of distorted time and distorted space: for them the processes taking place in Western and Eastern latitudes are much more important than the history of their own country or even the processes taking place 'here' and 'now' in the period of independence. Moreover, when quoting the thoughts of other scholars' Lithuanian philosophers merely rebroadcast the voices of quoted authors instead of listening to them. Consequently, Lithuanian philosophy is at best an echo of the voices of Western and Eastern authors transmitted from 'center' to 'periphery'. It is no wonder that in the *topos* far remote from the 'center' this echo is hardly audible.

CRISIS OF RISK

In summarizing the two positions on the crisis of Lithuanian philosophy we can identify their common conclusion: Lithuanian philosophy is always 'lagging behind'. In the former case it is lagging behind the ideal of a futuristic 'superior' philosophy that is impossible to realize in the present situation, while in the latter case it merely follows some Western and Eastern idols, which it rebroadcasts rather than interprets.

In both cases Lithuanian philosophy is condemned as 'immature'. On the other hand, the very features that lead to the condemnation of Lithuanian philosophy as immature may be used to justify it. By pointing at the lack of 'maturity' we may discard many imperfections of Lithuanian philosophical discourse. For example, it is obvious that we still do not have a settled philosophical vocabulary. This is regrettable and at the same time somewhat comical, as when discussions promising conceptual debates end as quarrels over the exact translation of some philosophical terms. However, by recalling our 'immature' age we settle for lower ambitions: an accurate usage of terms requires considerable philosophical skill, and hence disputes on the translation are really substantial. By taking this direction of self-justification and self-excuse one is able to turn a lot of philosophical steps into small 'revolutions', surely local, but still 'revolutions'.

This ambivalent procedure of self-derogation and self-excuse reveals another reason for the crisis of Lithuanian philosophy hiding beneath its

other manifestations, and that is the lack of risk. Lithuanian philosophy is averse to risks, as noticed by Alvydas Jokubaitis:

The reason that explains the dependency and unoriginality of Lithuanian philosophers is not their lack of creativity; but rather the fact that our whole philosophical tradition has been that of following in the wake of the huge Western philosophical icebreaker. Unlike the Westerners who take risks we know the future of our philosophical discourse quite well by looking at them: we know whether phenomenology, hermeneutics, or deconstruction is coming. This is the advantage of lagging behind (Jokubaitis 1997: 76).

There is nothing to add to this observation. Risk is simply absent when you are continuously lagging behind.

Even if it is conceded that Lithuanian philosophy is developing under conditions of little risk, do we not oversimplify the notion of risk here? The diagnosis of its ills envisages only one occasion of risk, that of leaving the laggards and dashing to the ranks of the trailblazers. Still, who today in Lithuania could seriously claim that we might soon not only close on but also overtake those whom we are following? The rhetoric of closing on and equaling relates the moment of dashing ahead to a *utopian* future, which has little in common with the *topos* of Lithuanian philosophy. Thus, by linking the risk to a utopian project the risk is turned into a merely desirable philosophical luxury instead of being the essence of philosophy. Hence the diagnosis of the Lithuanian philosophy as ‘lagging behind’ enables us to justify not only our lack of ‘maturity’ but also our aversion to risk.

The one-dimensional treatment of risk, which derives from the diagnosis of Lithuanian philosophy as ‘lagging behind’, might be interpreted as an indication of the narrowness of the diagnosis itself. By placing Lithuanian philosophy in such a *topos* that it can only be ‘lagging’ behind the *utopian* ideal this diagnosis conceives Lithuanian philosophy in such terms as ‘slack’, ‘lateness’, ‘slow-down’ or even ‘stopped development’, and ‘necessity of catching up’. However, too many phenomena relevant to contemporary developments in philosophy slip through this conceptual net.

THE *TOPOS* OF PHILOSOPHICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS

In our search for the *topos* where Lithuanian philosophers find themselves at present we intend to take a different path. We are going to link this *topos* neither to speculations on the past of Lithuanian philosophy nor to its relations with ‘foreign’ philosophy. When discussing the current situation of Lithuanian philosophy we should consider the attitude of Lithuanian philosophers to what they themselves speak and think rather than localize Lithuanian philosophy in relation to its past or to its ‘external environment’.

In our contemplations on the subject we rely on Michel de Certeau, a French philosopher and semiotician, who has distinguished two types of attitudes towards cognition, those of strategy and tactics. Following de Certeau we will focus not so much on the ordinary usage of these terms, but on the topological positions that the ‘strategist’ and the ‘tactician’.

The essential element of strategy is the subject of will and power who, according to de Certeau, has his own *topos* isolated from the spaces the strategy describes (De Certeau 1984: XIX). Since in his quest for ‘objectivity’ the subject of strategy keeps his distance from the spaces planned strategically, he relates to these spaces as if from the ‘outside’. The view from the outside makes the ‘strategist’s’ perspective one of ‘research’.

The ‘tactician’, by contrast, never has his own place, from which he could survey the tactical spaces from the outside with an objectifying and researching gaze. As de Certeau emphasizes, the *topos* of the ‘tactician’ is the location of *the other* rather than his own (De Certeau 1984: XIX). Being in such a *topos*, which is not isolated but squeezed into the tactical spaces, the ‘tactician’, as against the ‘strategist’, cannot enjoy a comprehensive view. For him, the tactical spaces reveal themselves as fragments rather than as a whole. This is why the ‘tactician’ is focused on situational practices of cognition rather than overall cognition. De Certeau reminds us that the tactical practice, which constantly adjusts itself to the situation, was called by Greeks *metis*, or courses of action (De Certeau 1984: XIX). Fishes and plants move in the *metis* manner. When a fish meets an obstacle in its way it simply bypasses it. The same goes for plants: if we cut off a branch of a tree it can ramify in the other direction. Thus, tactical practices described as *metis* may be regarded as the art of orientation in space and time, of weaving in and out.

Philosophy becomes strategic in the sense of de Certeau when a philosopher settles *above* the researched territories, i.e. in his own privileged *topos*, from which he seeks to comprehend the researched world as a whole that is modeled and planned. Since the ‘strategist’ is isolated from the environment he researches, his research has no conditions limiting it. The ‘strategist’ can include in his view each and every fragment of the investigated territory, but he resists his own inclusion in this view.

Although strategic thinking in philosophy is primarily associated with the modern progress of cognition based on thought, its manifestations can also be found in various procedures of philosophizing in different epochs. In Lithuania, in informal micro-duels strategy often trumps tactics. Moreover, here we often face those forms of strategic thinking, which lead to the sad state of Lithuanian philosophy. Lithuanian philosophy plays safe not because the philosophers are lagging behind the privileged source, but because they settle *above* the spaces they reflect on and discuss.

In the academic milieu of Lithuanian philosophy the following joke has been in circulation: *in the whole world to be an innovator you have to be the first; in Lithuania everybody is the first and everybody has his own strategic vision; hence, to be a true innovator you have to be the second.* In Lithuania even fledgling philosophers have no great difficulty in becoming *the first*, for they just need to come up with topics, which have not been discussed or hardly noticed before. Such fake innovations do not establish distinctive theoretical positions; they rather provide one with a distinctive self-dependent *topos*. For even lagging behind involves taking some risks, just by being in a situation where your own position is necessarily challenged by, or has to be coordinated with, *the other*, on whom you are thus dependent. This kind of ‘innovation’ is a privilege of being the only ‘proficient’ one in some area of the philosophical territory. Many philosophical topics are being fled not because they do not evoke any theoretical interest, but simply because they are *already* named and therefore are being treated as the property of the ‘proficient’.

By avoiding the risks of intrusion into the philosophical territories of the *other* strategic thinking generates a whole range of philosophical aporias, ‘deadlocks’ or ‘impasses’. Let us consider how these aporetic situations affect anyone entering Lithuanian philosophical discourse.

A. Aporia of Dialogue

An aporia of dialogue is a situation, in which two alternative strategies, both seeking to create conditions for a dialogue, bring about a condition where no dialogue is possible. Such aporias of dialogue can be observed during annual conferences organized by the Lithuanian Society for Philosophy. It is no secret that critical recourses are too scarce in Lithuania to expect heated discussions, disputes and polemics on any particular topic. Therefore each year, when discussing the theme of the conference to be held, efforts are made at finding issues, which could attract philosophers of different persuasions, e.g. “Postmodernism and its place in philosophy” (1997), “Rationality today?” (1998), “After subject: contemporary trends of philosophical evolution” (2000). Evidently, these are maximally broad descriptions intended to attract for discussions as many participants as possible. However, despite the good intention discussions do not take place precisely because of the breadth of the themes: each participant, bound by no specific theme, presents his position which often has no connection to the concerns of other participants. In the worst case we get a set of isolated visions that do not communicate at all, with each participant attending to the words of others from a safe, indifferent and ‘strategic’ distance.

B. Aporia of Critical Review

One may distance not only from the position of the other but also from one's own. This is a precondition for the possibility of self-criticism, i.e. the capability to revise one's own position. Yet a view from the all-embracing distance makes a revision of one's own position highly problematic, since the criticism involved here requires rethinking not only of some elements of one's own position, but also of the whole strategic 'vision', of the very core of one's position. This is a situation with only two 'ways out', both of which having little to do with genuine self-criticism: either refusing to revise one's vision because such revision would equal 'spinal fracture' and 'betrayal of ideals' or really changing one's attitudes yet without self-critical revision, just by following philosophical fashions. Neither 'way out' leads one out of the strategic field of philosophizing, since they both belong to the sphere of strategic and in this particular case inflexible thinking.

C. Aporia of Situatedness

The safe distance, which helps us keep our own inalterable position, creates conditions for another aporia, that of the current situation. The maintenance of a safe strategic distance always goes hand in hand with the hostility to situatedness, and we find its manifestations not only in the field of philosophy but in the whole cultural life of Lithuania. Current situations characterized by the dynamic development of events are dubbed as mere *topicalities* unworthy of serious consideration. This disregard for the current state of world, for what is taking place right before one's eyes is only discontinued when the issues get the attention of the 'authorities' in the West or in the East. In such cases even trifling topicalities may acquire the status of symptoms of 'global' phenomena. And yet it is assumed as a matter of course that the symptoms are to be discovered where they are expressed in the most intense form, i.e. in the West or the East. Thus reflections on the current situation become part of academic studies that allow keeping safe and neutral distance.

D. Aporia of Classics

The disregard of the current situation of the world or our daily environment as sources for philosophizing is often justified by alleged loyalty to the classics that have survived the tests of time. To be sure, due respect for the classics is a necessary feature of critical thinking. However, under Lithuanian conditions such respect quite paradoxically often leads to contrary results that restrict critical thinking. First, it is assumed that only the history of

philosophy rather than philosophy itself really exists (it is thus ‘forgotten’ that without regard to *this* situation an ever renewing critical thinking is hardly possible). Second, without being tested in today’s world the classics become mummified as museum showpieces, just worth of surveying and putting back to the dusty shelves of history (it is forgotten that many classics themselves considered the challenging of authorities as the first philosophical step). A ‘resurrection’ of the classics would amount to a miracle. Students of philosophy in the early stages of their education find themselves already in the aporetic situation of Buddha’s disciples: *kill Buddha if you see him*. Of course, such a radical act of resurrection of the classics is impossible under our circumstances. Those who refuse to read mummified classics move to other fields that are more congenial to our times or simply leave philosophy.

RISK OF SINGULARITY

It is obvious that these aporias are just samples demonstrating the way in which ‘strategic’ philosophizing steers philosophy into situations of crisis. We could surely identify many more ‘impasses’ that trap the procedures of education, academic conferences and individual creative work.

Though the list of aporias of Lithuanian philosophical discourse could be extended, we do not suggest that the whole of Lithuanian philosophy is continuously trapped in aporetic situations. Even if a ‘strategist’ seeks to embrace the whole field of reflection while trying to escape his own involvement in this field, the all-embracing ‘strategic’ position is itself just a part of the topographical map of philosophy surrounded by ‘tactical’ spaces. Alongside the locations where somebody settles *above* the reflected territories there are locations where one is settled *nearby* or *face-to-face*.

It is obvious that the shifting tactical stance allows movements in such trajectories on the topographical map that help avoid getting stuck in aporetic situations, the deadlocks. First of all, the ‘tactician’ is always in a situation, which does not belong to him and in which he finds himself facing *the other*. The ‘tactician’ does not even have the choice of whether to challenge the other or not, to start a dialogue or not. Being in the shifting territory of the other is already being in a situation of communication (of either dispute or dialogue). Only the direction of communication remains open, i.e. whether it leads to confrontation or consensus. Secondly, being in the presence of *the other* is a prerequisite of a view that is able to reconsider and revise itself. Even in a situation of polemical warfare it is possible to change the tactics, not to mention the possibility of correcting one’s stance in order to reach an understanding with the other. Circumstances and situations provide the space for critical resistance and opportunity to say “no”, and this resistance

must embrace one's own positions and attitudes as well. Such resistance is a continuous process, not a onetime action. Thirdly, the rationale of the tactical practices of cognition is orientation in real situations; thus philosophical 'tactics' in its essential characteristics is not hostile to situatedness, but is rather based on it and oriented by it. By reflecting on these situations a 'tactician' does not require any warranty either from a Western or from an Eastern authority, which purportedly should confirm the relevance and importance of supposed *topicalities*. Fourthly, since tactical cognition is necessarily involved in a situation of communication (of either dispute or dialogue), the classics of philosophy do not become mummified pieces of history but are the targets of polemical discussions. At the same time the opposition between the alleged 'live' experience of contemporary world and ostensibly 'dead' and 'stiff' heritage of the past is avoided.

However, if any deadlock can be broken is it still meaningful to speak about the crisis of Lithuanian philosophical discourse as generated by strategic thinking? As we saw, it is impossible not to get into an aporetic deadlock of thinking under the conditions of Lithuanian philosophy; nevertheless, it would seem that it is quite easy to extricate from them. However, the aporetic character of strategic thinking shows itself precisely in the fact that it leads to situations 'without an exit' and that it has no resources of its own for extricating itself from the deadlocks. The aporetic situations generated by 'strategic' thinking cannot be solved at the level of strategic practices but only on the plane of tactical practices of cognition. Yet there is no continuous trajectory or a direct path between the *topos* of the 'strategist', which is above the reflected territories, and the *topos* of the 'tactician', which is nearby. Even if, as noted, we can detect both strategic and tactical locations on the map of Lithuanian philosophy, they are situated on separate and incommensurable planes.

As shown by Peter Sloterdijk, a German philosopher of Dutch origins, the transition from the practices of panoramic cognition to the practices of situational cognition is not a matter of continuous 'evolution' but of radical change. Sloterdijk associates the transition with the change in the conception of criticism. When discussing the changes at the beginning of the 20th century, i.e. the 'death' of the classical conception of criticism and the impulses of the new critical theory, he says:

I believe that Critical Theory has found a provisional ego for critique and a "standpoint" that provides it with perspectives for a truly incisive critique – a standpoint that conventional epistemology does not consider. I am inclined to call it *a priori pain*. It is not the basis of elevated, distanced critique that achieves grand overviews but a stance of extreme closeness – micrology.

If things have become too close for comfort for us, a critique must arise that expresses this discomfort. It is not a matter of proper distance but of proper proximity (Sloterdijk 1988: XXXIII).

Looking at things at close range, from near proximity reverses the optics of looking: instead of keeping a stable distance as if it could ensure the objective and comprehensive view of the researched territory, the distance is relinquished together with its total and amorphous vision. In this case the task of the critical stance is that of the deconstruction of the 'whole' and the decentralization of the territories allegedly panoramically viewed yet often just projected and anticipated.

Like de Certeau, who holds that in tactics fragments become more important than the whole, Sloterdijk suggests the preference of a fragment beheld at close proximity to that of a whole surveyed from a remote position. Such a fragment is not an elementary part of the whole. The fragments beheld at close proximity are related to each other not by a unifying similarity, which reduces the separate fragments to one homogeneous space, but by the relation of difference. Like de Certeau and Sloterdijk, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have emphasized that nomadic thinking, which may be treated as analogous to the tactical practices of cognition and to the preference of close proximity, combines the reflected elements not to a coherent whole, but to singular sequences of formations combined/separated by the relation of difference (Deleuze, Guattari 1987: 7).

Thus it seems that the overcoming of the strategic view, one that is still strived for by Lithuanian philosophy, has *already* taken place in Western philosophy and needs only be repeated here. However, we would be wrong if we believed that the repetition is an elementary and mechanical procedure. Like every event, such a repetition is a singular and unitary act. Consequently, no theory or an individual theoretical belief can be treated as an unquestioned prototype or recipe according to which other theories and beliefs ought to be built.

The overcoming of the strategic thinking is inevitably accompanied by the risk involved in tactical practices, the risk of singularity. The risk emerges when one abandons the illusion that the event or element, which is being repeated, is conceptually more valid than the event or element in the subsequent repetition. Even when we repeat, i.e. interpret, a text created long ago the text does not necessarily subordinate and enslave the interpretation. An interpretation is not necessarily something secondary in relation to the text that is being interpreted. The risky interpretation is neither a renewal of something 'old' nor an invention of something wholly 'new'. The risky tactical practices render meaningless all attempts at 'originality', a quality that Lithuanian philosophy has always lacked according to the critics of its laggardness. Instead of

demanding fundamental inventions that would allegedly legitimate one's own autonomy and individuality the risk of singularity demands one's readiness relentlessly to reconsider *the very same* event or theory as something *other*.

In *Difference and Repetition*, while discussing the subject of repetition, Gilles Deleuze reminds us of a complaint by a character in Büchner's play:

It is so wearisome. First you put on your shirt, then your trousers; you drag yourself into bed at night and in the morning drag yourself out again; and always you put one foot in front of the other. There is little hope that it will ever change. Millions have always done it like that and millions more will do so after us. Moreover, since we're made up of two halves which both do the same thing, everything's done twice (Deleuze 1994: 4).

Viewed from the panoramic *topos* of strategic philosophy, each step is necessarily subordinated to the principle of monotony. Nevertheless, the fact that one step is similar to another does not mean that two steps following each other in a sequence are absolutely identical. On the tactical approach to cognition practices, the circumstance that one step has *already* been taken does not render the next step worthless. However trite it may sound yet each step in a row is a unitary and singular event.

In so far as Lithuanian philosophy ignores the risk of singularity, philosophy 'in our latitudes' is doomed to repeat what has *already* been reflected and described. In this regard, however, Lithuanian philosophy does not differ from 'foreign' philosophies complaining of 'decline' and lack of 'new' ideas. Both here and abroad, there is the need of taking the risk of singularity, of traversing anew the seemingly familiar territories of thought. Hence, it is more meaningful to ponder upon the contemporary *situation of philosophy* rather than on the conditions of philosophy *in Lithuania*.

Received 2007 03 20

Accepted 2007 04 09

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Translated by Gediminas Pulokas

Nerijus Milerius
LIETUVOS FILOSOFIJOS TOPOGRAFINIS ŽEMĖLAPIS

SANTRAUKA

Straipsnyje siekiama nužymėti Lietuvos filosofijos žemėlapiu kontūrus. Koncentruojamasi ne į konkrečias Lietuvoje kuriančių filosofų teorijas, bet į pačias filosofavimo sąlygas. Svarstant sąlygas, kuriomis Lietuvoje funkcionuoja filosofija, posovietiniu periodu jau ne kartą fiksuota jos kritinė būklė. Krizės priežastimis buvo laikomi du esminiai faktoriai. Pirma, tai – laiko netolydumas – vientisos linijinės filosofinės tradicijos stoka, atsiradusi pertraukus „organišką“ filosofijos vystymąsi sovietiniu režimu ir jo primetamomis mąstymo klišėmis. Antra, tai – erdvės netolydumas – Vakaruose užsimezgsių intelektualinių problemų perkėlimas į Lietuvos situaciją, neišvengiamai prarandant perkeliamų temų aktualumą ir kontekstualumą. Konstatuojama, jog abiem atvejais į Lietuvos filosofiją žiūrėta per „atsilikimo“, „vėlavimo“, „stokos“, „sulėtėjusio“ ar net „sustojusio vystymosi“, „pasivijimo būtinybės“ sąvokų prizmę. Straipsnyje argumentuojama, jog mąstant šiomis sąvokomis, filosofijos situacija Lietuvoje lieka esmiškai neaprašyta. Esmine filosofijos Lietuvoje charakteristika laikomas jos „strateginis“ pobūdis. Strateginis, visa aprėpiantis, į galutinius atsakymus pretenduojantis mąstymas neigia dialoginę ar kritinę savo paties atžvilgiu poziciją, nėra pajėgus reaguoti į naujus iššūkius, klasifikuoja ir mumifikuoja filosofijos istoriją. Kaip alternatyva „strateginei“ pozicijai akcentuojama „taktinė“ filosofija, nepretenduojanti į visuotinumą, bet atvira rizikai, kitybei ir kritiniams permąstymams.

RAKTAŽODŽIAI: Lietuvos filosofija, laiko ir erdvės tęstinumas, strategija, taktika, aporija.