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HISTORICAL TRADITION AND THE CHALLENGES  
OF MODERN HISTORY

Keywords: history of Lithuania, Lithuanian culture, historiography

The foundations of national Lithuanian culture acquired their definite shape in the period of the inter-war Lithuanian state between 1918 and 1940. In the course of over a hundred years having left behind the way of life of a peasant community, the Lithuanian nation laid claims to the rights of a modern nation. The rise of national states in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the triumph of nationalism and socialism, new social theories that rejected legitimate rights of the authorities and questioned their very legitimacy influenced the conscience of the Lithuanian intellectuals in one way or another and modified their attitudes towards the formation of the nation.

The process of the formation of the Lithuanian self-consciousness was significantly affected by romanticism reminding the people of the historical national experience. However, it was not only a glorification of the deeds of the dukes and the heathen past. The main components of Lithuanian national culture were ethnolinguistic values, embodied in history, folklore and in the way of life of the Lithuanian countryside. The two decades of the Lithuanian state were devoted to the creation of distinctive professional culture (theatre, art, music, literature), and a young Lithuanian intelligentsia began envisaging its ethnographic culture in the contemporary European context. This turning point in the formation of historical self-consciousness equalled the writing of a new history, and its writers were Lithuanian intellectuals.

Lithuanian national culture and ideology did not develop in natural conditions, although at the beginning of the twentieth century their forms and contents were quite clearly structured. Probably the main impediment was the relationship between Lithuanian national ideology and the age-old multi-cultural historical tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian estate-structured union state. The

Lithuanians, like many other Eastern central European nations chose the ideological model of ethnic culture and nationalism, which subsequently often turned into a political imperative in the relations with ethnic minorities and neighbouring nations. History, like the past, is inseparable from the changes of the present. It is common knowledge that political, social and ideological changes influence the strategy of historical research and even of cognition. In 1988 and 1989, in the period of reconstruction in Lithuania and of the national *Sąjūdis* movement the pre-war ideology of national values and nationalism was revived for some time. True, historical research sustained some losses: the investigation of social economic history was neglected. At this time prominence was given to such problems as the place of the history of Lithuania (and generally of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) in the history of European civilization, the similarities and differences peculiar to other states of Eastern and Central Europe, the post-war deportations of the Lithuanian population and the partisan struggle between 1944 and 1953. It is noteworthy that in their works Lithuanian historians exploit contemporary social and political theories of the West in the processing of the empirical material; thus new research results are obtained and new contexts revealed. On the other hand, history, claiming to the status of scholarly discipline, must raise and solve issues of the present-day life, i.e. it must be pragmatic. The German historians of the 1860s and 1870s treated historical scholarship as performing social functions and closely linked to the education of society. The German historical philosopher Jurgen Rusen distinguished four types of historical consciousness: traditional, illustrative, critical, and genetic. In the first case the importance of historical tradition and morality and their interdependence are stressed. According to the second type history is a collection of examples to be followed. *Historia magistra vitae*, such was the maxim of Western historiography. It influences the people's orientation in life and their moral values, treated as immutable. Critical thinking questions and even rejects tradition and consequently creates a new identity. Its contribution to moral values is their critique based on logical argumentation. This is the liberal viewpoint. The genetic type looks to the past leniently, the prospective dynamic creation of the identity rather than the past itself is important. Morality loses statics, it is utilitarian, consumerist, and dependant on circumstances. Modern processes of globalization and integration and commercialization of culture,

broadly speaking, enables one to speak about the pragmatic function of history in consumer society.

At present three main trends can be relatively distinguished in Lithuanian historiography: liberal, nationalistic and source related (*ad fontes*). Certainly, they do not exist in their pure forms and often take over research elements from one another. Ideological commitment of historians is observed in the research of such themes as the Holocaust in Lithuania, post-war resistance movement, and the culture of the Renaissance and Reformation. In the latter question discussions are taking place between the Catholic and secular strategies. Sometimes a kind of monopoly is sheltered in a particular field of research. Thus, the liberal discourse dominates in the research of the formation of a modern Lithuanian nation in the nineteenth century and in the study of the Holocaust. Meanwhile the nationalistic discourse prevails in the post-war history of Lithuanian resistance between 1945 and 1953. Increased attention to the issues of the GDL is also noticeable. The aggrandizement of gentry patriotism, the glorification of the Lithuanian Statutes as distinct signs of law, the celebration of the Constitution of 3 May 1791 attest to the search of the construction of a new identity. In the history of this state liberally minded historians, strange, as it might seem, see the embryo of civil society.

Following the rise of the *Sąjūdis* movement in 1988 greater attention was paid to the Lithuanian Jewish community and its history. Old Jewish cemeteries and places of genocide were registered and taken care of, and memorial plaques were put up at those sites. The 23rd of September was declared the memorial day of the Lithuanian state commemorating the Jewish genocide. The Lithuanian Holocaust has its own historiography. Contemporary Lithuanian historians dispelled the myth that the Jews made up the majority in the Lithuanian Communist and local government and in the repressive structures. In his book published in English, Professor Alfonsas Eidintas submitted new facts about the Holocaust in Lithuania and conceptually summarized the studies of Lithuanian historians. Investigating the activity of the local Lithuanian authorities and the police between 1941 and 1944, the historian Vytautas Bubnys showed that these structures were exploited by the Nazis sometimes indirectly and more often directly in carrying out the genocide against the Jews.

The ongoing integrative processes in Europe emphasize the importance of the past of urban conglomerates and inter-state re-

gions. The town is researched synthetically as a complex multi-cultural organism of the Eastern and Central European region. The investigation of the city of Vilnius as a multi-cultural historical urban object reveals certain regional aspects of European civilization, the historical and contemporary self-consciousness of the multi-national population of the city and intensifies integrative processes.

At present the social differentiation of Lithuanian society is particularly obvious and its consequence is political disunity. Such a socio-political situation cannot but affect historical consciousness which is undergoing essential changes. The poll conducted by the RAIT research group between 2 and 5 December 2004 established that the most unsuccessful period in the history of Lithuania is considered the time since the restoration of Lithuania's independence in 1990 by over a third of the Lithuanian population (34.2%), the Soviet occupation of 1940-1990 by 29.7%, the rule of tsarist Russia (1797-1915) by 22.7% and the period of Poland-Lithuania since the 1569 Union of Lublin by 7.3%. It is noteworthy that the period after 1990 is treated negatively by people whose income is low and by the unemployed, who associate this period with their impoverishment and loss of social perspectives. That only shows the effect of the social reality on the transformations in the people's consciousness and in their beliefs and values. This does not mean the negation of history; it is rather an attempt of opposing oneself to 'the political elite'. There are also other data revealing different preferences. In an opinion poll conducted in 2003 the answers to the question 'What you as a citizen are mostly proud of?' were the following: basketball (35%), history of Lithuania (32%), and the Lithuanian language (22%). That shows the vitality of the traditional historical consciousness, and the question is only whether it can be long-lasting.

In conclusion, it can be stated that during the period of fifteen years academic Lithuanian historiography crossed the boundary of the national historical discourse and became part of common European history.

LIFE IN GLOBAL INFORMATIONAL SOCIETY:  
BODY, SPACES, COMMUNITIES

Keywords: Lithuania, globalization, informational society, body, spaces, communities

The article analyzes several aspects of the global web society including the relation between a body (and its absence on the Internet) and space, and the conditions for the establishment of virtual communities.

In this article, the author argues that the appearance of the Internet has been connected to the archaizing of culture (of course, we don't have in mind a real return to the state of the pre-modern culture). Talking of modernization, the Lithuanian sociologist Vytautas Kavolis suggested that we should understand it in a broader way as a process that takes place on several levels and that moves towards the opposite directions at the same time. Therefore, he considers not only modernizing forces (individualism, historicism, rationalism, universalism and humanization) but also anti-modernity (the inversion of the mentioned values), archaization and postmodernism (Kavolis 2005 2–9). Postmodernism and archaism emerge as the attempts to unite what the process of modernization had disjointed. We should emphasize that this archaism does not correspond to the pre-modern archaism but it has been created as a result of modernization. It is a construct of modernization.

It is this V. Kavolis's idea that I will borrow in attempting to describe the chosen aspects of the information society. The Internet archaizes culture, i. e. revives some cultural forms expelled by modernization.

We all know that the Internet offers a huge amount of information. However, the issue of confidence and trust always arises with regard to this information. In this environment, gossip, namely unreliable but from the first sight compelling information, can proliferate. This information can be comprised of unspoken phrases, undelivered speeches or unwritten articles attributed to a certain famous person. The Internet created conditions for the easy dissemination of untested information that might not correspond to the reality. If, in the traditional society, gossip was transmitted orally, currently it travels from one mailbox to another.

The Internet revives another phenomenon that can be called Internet folklore: various stories, anecdotes, pictures, short videos, etc. moving from one mailbox to another. They are authorless; they survive only until they are transmitted and shared, i. e. until they function in the virtual communities. This way of their functioning reminds of the functioning of folklore.

Orality is also characteristic of the Internet culture. The neo-language prevalent on the Internet (it can be said not only of the English language but also of other languages including Lithuanian) denies the rules of a written language without changing the structure of a spoken language. For instance, on the Internet, "for you" is transformed into "4U." Words and phrases that don't make sense acquire meaning when we read them aloud. Thus, this written discourse refutes, in a sense, the culture of writing. Doubtless, we cannot ascribe this discourse to oral culture since it is indeed a written discourse. However, it is oriented towards orality.

The author also proposes the hypothesis of a "publicized private space." According to him, the division between the public and private spaces disappears on the Internet. Similarly, in the medieval culture, the public and private were not separated.

Richard Sennett argues that the division between the public and private is the result of modernity. The word "publicity" originated from the constructed realization that all citizens together governed property and the common good. The word "private" was used for the first time to indicate the privileges of a ruling stratum. By the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, these terms already acquired the meanings they have today. The public was identified with the electorate and life-spheres visible to each person, and everything separated from the public became private.

During the pre-modern time, privacy was not a secret place. In the houses, there usually existed several rooms populated by a whole family: both parents and children slept in the same bed. The public and private spaces had not been yet separated. It was the civilization process, as Elias understands it, that divided this integral space into the public and private. At the same time, the need for self-presentation in public arose. Sex, eroticism and passions were pushed to the private sphere. The private space was closed for the glances of other people. It was hidden behind the veil of public self-presentations.

The mentioned Elias describes the way in which the civilization process tamed the body. Analyzing the medieval books of cour-

tesy that describe, for instance, how to behave by the table, the scholar demonstrates that the intellectuals' advice penetrated everyday life. In time civilized customs became divorced from uncivilized ones. In their behavior, the elite separated themselves from the commoners. This change witnessed nothing else but the division between the public and private. This division transformed the models of everyday aggressive behavior; it confined sex to privacy. Thus, self-presentation, the knowledge of etiquette and rational discussions (in Habermas's understanding) became the domain of the public. Sex and sensations constituted the private realm.

Let's return, after this short digression, to the Internet. Is it possible to separate clearly the public and private spaces on the Internet? Do the criteria formed by the Western civilization function in the virtual space? In my opinion, the division between the public and private does not exist in the virtual space. Here the space is uniform and undivided: in this space, we can live, i. e. share our feelings, thoughts, experiences with others and also acquire new experiences. Since I consist, in the virtual space, only of spoken sentences and written texts, I cannot go to the wings and take off my masks. I cannot do it because, on the Internet, like in the Medieval Ages, wings do not exist. The Internet does not have a stage either; it is comprised of a uniform homogenized space.

The Internet emancipated what the Western culture had imprisoned in the private space. The so-called virtual sex and pornographic websites are particularly popular on the Internet. Virtual sex that takes place in the chatrooms is not only safe; it also arouses the most intensive passions: you can easily find a partner here and share your most secret thoughts with him/her.

Research on the Internet market demonstrates that 20 % of all electronic mail is of sexual character. Pornographic pages receive huge numbers of visitors. Now, when we want to watch a pornographic movie or read a pornographic magazine, we don't have to go to a cinema or a shop (incidentally, it can be done only abroad since pornography is prohibited in Lithuania). We don't have to publicize our "selves," therefore most Internet users take up this opportunity. It is also interesting that research conducted in different countries shows that most workers visit pornographic web pages during their work time bringing the huge losses for their employers.

The author also talks of the balancing of the contemporary society between the Panopticon and Synopticon.

Generally, the information society has been developing towards the following direction: as many life spheres as possible have been moved to the Internet, and as many jobs have been attempted to accomplish with the help of the information technologies. It is possible to imagine the society-to-come in which every individual will be able to conduct any everyday transaction with the help of information technologies (in most cases, it will be either more convenient or there will be no choice). Information technologies will help (as they do today) to buy, receive information, correspond, etc. Essentially, in this society, everyone is observed or, more precisely, it is possible to trace each person's individual trajectory through the things he bought, read, wrote, etc. In his famous book "Cyberpower. The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet," Tim Jordan describes the following vision: each person has his/her own unique digital signature; this signature is always visible when one conducts a financial transaction. Since a credit card is used during the act of purchase – either in the virtual space or in "real" shops" – it is possible to determine when and what one buys. It is also possible to learn the source of an individual income. Besides, the card is used during other actions related to one's education, career, etc. Thus, everyday activities – income, purchases, and biographical facts – are constantly registered in certain data banks. This way the system is involved in surveillance, i. e. the system is programmed to report any unusual activity of an individual. For instance, a person conducts a purchase the value of which exceeds his income. The government has the right to check this person's individual record. All cars have satellites that enable to trace their place of location. If anything unusual happens in any system, all cars belonging to you are localized and followed. Finally, a personal signature is combined with a personal identification: with a face heat image and perhaps with fingerprints. Video cameras observe all public places: roads, shops or offices. The image of a person filmed by a camera can be easily compared to his/her personal signature. Therefore, it is possible to trace the place of a person's location and detain him/her if anything unusual occurs. For instance, to carry on any terrorist activity in the U. S. territory becomes more difficult. The U. S. citizens agreed with this system of surveillance in order to feel safe. The technologies able to create such systems and guarantee safety already exist (Jordan, 2000, 197–198).

Hence, we move in the direction described by Foucault: power becomes less visible; however, it permeates each everyday micro-

practice. If previously only very few were subjected to surveillance (those on the margins of society, mental patients, prisoners, etc.), now the minority observes the majority. This kind of society creates perfect conditions for a dictatorship: every person can be controlled effectively. Such society also is favorable for social engineering. The fundamental division between the public and private ceases to exist in this kind of society: everything is public and vice versa.

We should also mention a different aspect: the ruled are not powerless at all. According to Thomas Mathiesen, Foucault did not pay enough attention to another process of modernity, first of all, the development of mass media and the reversal of a gaze: now the majority observes the minority. We have in mind stars of TV, sports and politics observed by the majority of people.

Here we have to remember the spread of personal diaries, so-called weblogs, on the Internet. Journalists must control politicians and state officers. The Internet enables each person to become a journalist. It is possible to imagine that a person can take pictures of politicians and ask about the content of their discussions if he/she meets them at a café or a restaurant. Furthermore, we can also imagine a webpage containing the diaries of politicians' meetings with their constituents. This way, politicians would feel that they are observed and that their words are recorded.

Finally, the author discusses communities, an intersection of the virtual and real worlds. He argues that trust is particularly important in forming communities.

Virtual communities are based only on trust (so is the existence of weblogs). We can judge web-persons whom we meet in the virtual space only according to their own pronouncements. They can pretend and deceive. However, even if we know it we tend, in most cases, to trust them. The author also analyzes a new phenomenon "flashmob" (when a group of people is organized by the means of the Internet for an event that is not very meaningful).

The "flashmob" technology – to gather unexpectedly and promptly in an appointed place, to carry out an activity and disperse – is very useful in creating riots. Hence, it is not surprising that it is used in mass turmoil and protest actions. The Internet played a significant role in "orange," "rose" and other revolutions in post-Soviet countries. Although the spread of the Internet is not particularly wide in post-Soviet countries, it is sufficient to organize an active part of society.

The web unites fellow citizens who aspire for similar goals (for instance, for the democratization of society or even an incitement of turmoil and violence). It enables people to organize for some action. But in order to organize they have to trust each other. Often they do not know each other and it is likely that they will never meet in a real life. However, by trusting each other they can carry out a social activity.

ELECTRONIC ART IN LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA:  
GLOBAL PROCESSES AND LOCAL INITIATIVES

Keywords: Lithuania, the Baltic States, electronic art, media culture, media laboratory, network

The article discusses the possible influence that various inner and outer factors such as national and regional cultural policies, strategies of international and national cultural foundations, networking practices, mobility, and liberalization of cultural space, development of ICT sector and growth of information society can have on actors operating in various media culture layers. In the article a big importance is given to the analysis of networking practices and trials to create a backbone for the collaboration of new media culture centers in the Baltic Sea region as well as Northern Europe. The text focuses on the analysis of related to media culture initiatives of public institutions, cultural organizations and communities as well as individuals.

Electronic media art began to appear in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the mid-1990s, but the preconditions for the development of this art form existed earlier, in the interdisciplinary projects, mail art, light installation and video art practices of the second half of the 1980s. That period witnessed active attempts at establishing a neo-avant-garde in the audiovisual and visual arts, along with the beginnings of interdisciplinary and subversive artistic strategies and the emergence of a specific language and discourse for media art. The political, economic and socio-cultural changes that took place in the country during the 1990s were significant for the development of this new generation of art: the restoration of independence and the integration into an international sphere of politics and culture, the development of a free market economy, of information and consumerist society, as well as the modernisation of cultural institutions and increased artist mobility. Thought, the Baltic States faced very similar economical and political, cultural problems and the starting point for the development of electronic art was almost analogous it evolved in quite different directions and in different speed, especially this is notable in the strategies of culture institutions, international networking practices and the development of critical electronic culture discourses in events and various media.

The process of ICT adaptation into art and culture sector in Central and Eastern Europe started only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and increased with the integration into EU. A significant role for media art development and integration into Western art space played the chain of NVO, so called *Open Society Institutes* established in the former soviet countries by American philanthropist Georges Soros. Especially important were Internet and Looking Inside programs as well as initiatives of Soros Contemporary Art Centers (SCCA). In the beginning of the 90s Soros Foundations were the only sources for culture and art funding in the region. Only few years later national structures for culture financing were established and other Western funds opened for Eastern and Central Europe culture practitioners and researchers.

Very significant role for the development of electronic media art played SCCA in Estonia. With the support of the Centre an international new media festival *Interstanding* was organized in Tallinn in 1995. The most topical discourses of the meantime cyber-culture were imported from the West and the famous artists and theorist invited to Tallinn. In association with the conference, the SCCA organized its annual exhibition under the title *Biotopia*, which, looking at the connections between technology and biology was ahead of its time. The festival was organized periodically by the same actors. Few years earlier E-Media Centre was established in Estonian Art Academy and became an active new media culture promoter not only in the country but abroad as well. Despite of a very strong electronic media centre in Tallinn some minor but not less important initiatives were started in Parnu and Tartu and small media culture communities formed there. Estonia got international recognition as an important electronic media venue what was best proved by ISEA2004 meeting which was held in Tallinn and Helsinki in Aug 2004.

In Latvia, Riga quite active new media culture community was formed with the initiatives of El@b Electronic Laboratory which gain an international recognition after becoming *Ars Electronica* prize winner in the year 1998 and a coordinator of important international networks such as *Xchange* and *NICE*. El@b had been reorganized in the year 2000 and grown into centre of new media RIXC. The centre continues the initiatives of El@b the most widely known of which is international new media art festival *Art + Communication* annually organized in Riga. In Latvia differently from Estonia

and Lithuania the main initiatives and electronic media culture communities are concentrated mainly in Riga.

In Lithuania had been several trials to establish electronic media laboratory since late 90s but none of them was successful. Electronic media culture is quite wide spread in all biggest cities (Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai) of the country but the local initiatives are quite small and significant only for the local public. In last five years in Vilnius several events dedicated to high and popular electronic media culture were organized. The international recognition gained electronic music festival *Young Music* annually organized in Vilnius. Differently from the situation in Latvia and Estonia, electronic media art in Lithuania was quite late recognized by the main contemporary art players. Only in 2003 Contemporary Art Centre in Vilnius organized international net art exhibition. And still in the country the most dominant form of media art is video. Talking about education programs for new media artists or researchers the situation is very similar in all three countries. Still there is not enough both professional lecturers and students eager to learn. Thus artist residencies and studies abroad are very crucial for young media art fans professional growth.

## TECHNOGENIC CIVILIZATION, MEDIA AND CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

Keywords: globalization, technogenic civilization, informational revolution, culture

This article discusses various aspects of the effect of the processes of technogenic civilization and globalization on the rapidly developing modern metacivilizational culture. Analyzing current civilizational processes the author shows that the gradual transition of humanity to a new *post-industrial technogenic* society constitutes the main contents of the present epoch and of the formation of the metacivilizational culture within it. Global metacivilization is not a mechanical amalgamation of various local civilizations and cultures. Its rise is directly related to a revolution in information technology, which, together with the most modern technologies, is the principal factor of contemporary culture stimulating an overall multi-cultural polylogue of civilizations. The revolution in information technology and concomitant tendencies of cultural globalization lead to the sharing of the spiritual experience worldwide, the principles of seeing the world, systems of values, cultural symbols. It also facilitates the perception of the cultural variety throughout the world and of the fact that different nations complementing each other similarly treat the same basic problems of human beings.

In the changed circumstances the most powerful factor is not the *traditional material production* but *theoretical knowledge, the intellectual potential of a particular nation and a complex motivating system functioning in society*, which either spurs or impedes a free creative activity of the individual. Thus, a new system of values, which lays particular stress on the intellectual potential and knowledge, and urges people to permanently develop their creative power, is being built. Therefore, the countries having mastered information technologies and capable of creating new ones *acquire incredible power and dictate their terms in various fields of economic and cultural life*. Consequently, globalization promotes a completely new re-distribution of power in the world, when the economic level of Western and Eastern states in the post-industrial stage of their development reaches the heights distinguishing them from other countries.

Ousted from the first ranks of the technogenic and social progress some countries often become powerless in the face of cut-throat competition. Organized into strong economic and political unions, the superpowers *monopolize the most profitable spheres of economic and cultural activities, impose their own terms of the control of up-to-date technologies and concentrate them only in post-industrial states*, thus leaving the less developed countries increasingly dependant on the strongest ones. This important imposition of the principles of great inequality in the post-industrial informational society in conditions of total globalization brings to the fore the post-modernist principle of *différence* and pervades all spheres of intellectual creative relations.

The appearance of new means of electronic mass communication, in particular of the global computer network (www) radically changes the situation. On the one hand, it eliminates the traditional concepts of 'travel' and 'distance', and on the other, the information revolution pulls down the walls dividing the national states and reinforces universal cultural tendencies. The display culture of the monitor is universal in origin, and it removes communication constraints of the writing culture. The most fundamental distinguishing trait of the new post-national metacivilization is *the development of the entire planet into a field of the integral information discourse*. It is no exaggeration to call contemporary civilization *information metacivilization*.

Technogenic revolution turned information into a most easily proliferating value and product, the use of which does not require an increase of production costs. Expenditure on the creation of knowledge industry is actually incomparably lower than the chances of their use and profit generation. Even insignificant investment can create a wealth of knowledge, and contrarily, large-scale investment in the industry of the creation of new knowledge cannot yield adequate returns since much depends on the intellectual potential and the ability of a creative individual to find an original solution of the problem. Such has been the formation of a new field of intellectual economics of almost inexhaustible resources; and *the most important competitive factor of the country became a high qualification level of the labour force and its knowledge and ability of creative adaptation*. Consequently, in post-industrial information society intellectual property and intellectual capital were no less important than private property and capital were in industrial society.

Therefore, the traditional ideals of the pursuit of material wealth and rapid career, peculiar to capitalist society, lost their attractiveness among the elite of the post-industrial countries in the last decade. They were ousted by other interests: *the value of a meaningful and interesting job, the development of one's potential abilities, and life in a pleasant natural environment and in the milieu of one's own people*. Thus, the main objectives of the individuals are the development of their capabilities, broadening their intellectual horizon, and *imbuing their activity with a sensible creative motivation*. It is no accident that post-industrial information society increasingly values good education; at the same time a gap in the wages of the people of decent and poor education is evident. In present-day Japan *good education in prestigious universities is treated as a principal value and excellent investment in the future for which a family spends a considerable part of its budget*. The significance of all-round education and intellectual capabilities stimulates the social differentiation and polarization of industrial society and in time can cause social tensions and conflicts.

The turning point in the present-day *metacivilizational* post-modern culture is the transition from the linear text culture created by the book civilization to the *view* culture based on the new virtual reality of the television and computer monitors. The essence of this new culture, considerably influencing the post-modern conscience and perception of reality is *the flow of constantly changing views in the space of the monitor rather than a linear text*. It is the speech of the people, animation modelling, written texts, sights and sounds and many other component parts. A distinguishing feature of the *view* culture compared to the *text* culture of the book is the diversity of information, personal contact and an authentic communication with the partner seen talking on screen.

This global shift from *text* to *view* accounts for the vanishing of the classical Western principles of thought and creation and the increasing influence of the 'neo-classical' principles developed in the area of hieroglyphic culture (China and Japan). It is obvious that the cultural traditions of the Far Eastern civilizations are among the richest uninterrupted traditions that produced modern and extremely suggestive principles of thinking, creation, and art.

The hieroglyph underlying this culture is a pictogram, a synthetic visual structure, a model of the multidirectional freely developing *view* culture, satisfying the needs of the new post-modern

information culture. And lastly, hieroglyphic culture is characterized by a synthetic visual associative perception of reality, because the hieroglyphic structures embrace the origins of the three great (Chinese and Japanese) arts – calligraphy, poetry and painting. The computer is a machine of the creation and processing of views using pictograms like the hieroglyphic script.

The appearance of computers with their monitors and huge information fields encompassed the possibilities of the book and view culture. The recreated world of the book culture enters the monitor and creates a new synthetic information space in which one can instantaneously communicate with an unlimited number of authors of various epochs and continents. Thus, the culture of the monitor view incredibly expands the use of the information field of the book culture by creating a new information space. In it the narrative character of the book culture based on the culture of the written text is abandoned, and the traditional monologue is replaced by the polylogue. Reading a text on the monitor differs from reading a book.

On the one hand, it is a dialogue between the author of the screen text and its reader, drawn into an active communication with the former. On the other hand, it is a possibility to invite new partners to this dialogue and begin a polylogue merely by clicking a button.

The screen culture stimulates the rise of new forms of thinking and perception of reality which are characterized by rapidity, flexibility, reactivity, the interaction of logical and visual elements and of the conception and view. Such access to information enables the spiritual perfection of the individual, since information can be obtained anywhere on the planet and at any time. Therefore, there is no simple and unequivocal answer to the question whether in the nearest future the computer with its increasingly sophisticated programmes will remain a *neutral* tool, subordinate to the human being. The domination of the monitors and screens in the technotronic era of mass communications attests to the fact that we are witnesses of the formation of a strikingly different intercultural communication and the perception of the priorities of the world, personality, nation, everydayness and culture.

Computer revolution opened the epoch of self-publication, in which the publication of new books is less important than the accumulation of information and communication with the partner on

the screen (the further development of technologies and computer networks most probably will lead to the steady decrease of printed books). On the other hand, it created a new space of physically flexible *hypertexts* and *intertexts* with their enormous amounts of information and mobility of its use. In the Internet labyrinths of books, reference publications, encyclopedias and in their information supplementing images one can float like in an ocean. These electronic physically flexible hypertexts, images and words flowing on the screen are characterized by the possibilities of text transformation akin to the hieroglyphic script. Here, like reading hieroglyphic texts one can move from the left to the right, or from the right to the left, upwards or downwards. Such transformations are quite normal in the screen culture.

Unlike the traditional book, there appear new relations between the text and its perceiver, and, exploiting fine arts, a possibility of a new multi-layered thinking and three-dimensional visual modelling of reality. In addition to a direct personal communication between people, a type of communication of the screen culture with its 'information space' is created. An inquisitive individual can enter the information space, read electronic newspapers, magazines and books and watch films.

At the present time when humanity reached a new stage of its development, certain negative consequences of the information revolution are already evident. Each qualitative technological leap is inevitably associated with some losses. The invention of the computer, the development of the Internet system and the easy access to information led to the decline of the hunger for knowledge, of the will of truth, and creation is becoming shallow and fragmented. It is not *an entire cultural text, but a fragment torn out from the context, a summary, a collection of quotations, a substitute* that are considered sufficient. Thus is lost the fundamentality of thinking and creation, fostered by the book civilization and classical humanitarian education, and standardization and levelling grow.

This process is particularly evident in television, which as a means of information and leisure is increasingly ousting newspapers and books. Expressive images spontaneously flowing on the screen according to the laws of the plot usually overshadow the importance of the story and turn into a sort of self-sufficient subject of admiration. Profound texts of classical book culture tied to the lines of the plot and clearly defined social ideals are replaced on the

television screen by images and texts produced by the commercial post-modernist culture for the sake of leisure; they lack both depth and contents and polysemous meanings.

Information is power, because knowledge and their efficient application are the most important factor of modern economy and a strategic basis of the transformation of technogenic society. The control of powerful means of electronic mass communications, television channels, and information services is the control of the world market and consequently of the world. Even the decisive factors of the world trade are not their traditional driving forces (capital, work quality, raw materials); first of all it is a resourceful use of mass information that is the main lever of financial success and the tool of power and influence. In the process of market monopolization and indication of terms it is possible to buy raw materials and manufacture goods in various countries of the world. However, the demand of the production, its circulation, use and the effectiveness of trade depend on the information media.

THREE IMAGES OF THE GLOBALIZING WORLD:  
CIVILIZATIONAL CONTRAPOSITION,  
WESTERN DIVISION AND GLOBAL ADMINISTRATION

Keywords: globalization, the West, culture, civilization

The phenomenon of globalization may be approached from a dynamic point of view as diversified freedom of movement in the world of today in such areas as work force, commodities, services, and capital. It may also be approached from a static point of view as a structure, a more or less stable network of existing and acting wherein the aforementioned types of freedom manifest themselves. It is from this latter standpoint that the author discusses the three prevailing paradigms of the contemporary world: a battlefield of most powerful and influential civilizations (Samuel P. Huntington); the schism of the West and its political, cultural, and social consequences for the rest of the globe (Robert Cooper); and finally the world as global governance, an international network of state representatives interacting between themselves in a relatively autonomous fashion, disaggregating the state into many political functions that no longer need to be run by the unitary state.

THE WEST AND ISLAM: CONFRONTATION OR  
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING?

Keywords: the West, Islam, Christianity, religion, morality, ideology, confrontation, mutual understanding

The principal aim of this article is to reveal those religious features (not only and not so much of Islam), which in one way or another have affected and can affect the relations between Islam and the West in future. First, some peculiarities of the development of Christianity and Islam crucial for the formation of these religions are analyzed; second, one of the main manifestations of the crisis of Western morality – the weakening of the moral functions – is dealt with; third, the different attitudes of religious and liberal ideologies to the personality, society and being are examined; and finally some variants of the development of the relations between the West and Islam including Lithuania's situation in the context of the aforementioned problems are discussed.

The conflict between the West and Islam is primarily a conflict between the traditional religious and modern secularized cultures. According to the adherents of secularized culture Islamic society was backward and intolerant, while in the opinion of the representatives of the religious viewpoint Western culture was corrupted. Consumerism referred to by Francis Fukuyama is one but not the principal manifestation of this degradation. The main criticism levelled at the West by the supporters of the traditional cultures throughout the world is secularization and the accompanying moral crisis. It is noteworthy that such views are adhered to not only by Islamic fundamentalists but also by all religious people, including Christians.

**The Functions of Morality.** The concept of morality depends primarily on the concept of man. Man may be viewed as a purely biological being – *a featherless biped*, they said in ancient Greece. Then, the main concerns of man are eating and reproducing, and the main moral tenet – the pursuit of pleasure. In this way, he does not differ from an animal: not accidentally, again in ancient Greece, hedonists were compared to pigs that overeat and wallow in mud. We can also view man as a social being – in Aristotelian terms, *a political animal*. In this case, the main goal of man is happiness. Then, the

main ethical goal is to create such rules of behavior that one man's pursuit of happiness does not interfere with that of others. The leading regulator of human relations becomes the law. And finally, man may be viewed as a transcendental being. Then, the main function of morality becomes the regulation of relations with a transcendental being or beings.

Let us distinguish and examine in detail three functions of morality: creation integration, orientation, and regulation.

The main function of morality is that of being, in which a human is assured of eternity, creation and sustenance. This function could be called creative. It is based on two principal premises: total determinism and the priority of the spiritual over the material. Total determinism means that nothing happens by accident in the world and that everything has its causes and consequences. The priority of the spiritual over the material means that in this string of causes and consequences moral or, in a broader sense, spiritual causes rather than physical, chemical, or biological ones predominate. It is not the human mind that adapts itself to the material world, but the material world develops according to the laws of morality.

Morality always treats human beings as part of a certain social, biological, or ontological unit – family, nation, nature. Developing an apprehension of union with this unit and striving for it constitute the essence of the integrating function of morality. If a person sees himself as a creature of God, he will strive for union with God; if he sees himself as part of nature, he will strive for union with nature; and if – as a citizen – for union with society, etc.

Another function of morality is that of orienting. Morality helps a person orient himself in the world, determine the goals and directions of his activity, and consider different ideas about the meaning of life. For one person, the meaning of life may be to serve God, for another – to strive for respect and appreciation, and for a third – to seek after pleasure.

And finally, the fourth function of morality is the regulating one. Morality deals with man's relations with others, with nature, and with God: these are the manifestations of the regulating function of morality. This regulating may be either coherent or fragmentary: it may involve a particular system of values or concern only special spheres of life or activity.

All four functions reflect separate aspects of morality, and, in a sense, they are equal. However, their potential possibilities are dif-

ferent. The creative function of morality covers all spheres of life and all theoretical and practical possibilities of activity. It is perhaps best attested in Indian tradition. The root of the term *dharma* 'morality; religion, law' *dhr-* means 'that to which one must strictly adhere'. It is imperative to adhere strictly in all spheres of life in the relations with God, nature and people. The integrationist function of morality can be narrower. The human being doubtless seeks unity with God, and the difference between the creative and integrationist functions is insignificant. However, if one seeks integration only with his/her collective or family, the sphere of their moral activity is narrower than that of the human being seeking to create and support existence. Still narrower is the orientational function of morality. The purpose of life is not only to support the existence, integrate with God, but also to pursue pleasure. Pleasure can be pursued in various ways, therefore for some pleasure may be limited by the bedroom or dining room. The regulatory function of morality is potentially the narrowest. Some individuals can conform to certain norms of morality just for the sake of decency without ever giving thought to the purpose of life, the problems of good and evil, and without any wish to integrate and still less to seek the unity with God. In this respect, one can speak about the hierarchy of the functions of morality. The creative function is the most complete and perfect and the regulatory function is the narrowest. The moral crisis of the West is seen in the weakening of all four functions of morality.

**The Decline of the Creative Function of Morality.** This function is realized as an activity directed towards preservation, organization and restructuring of the world, or in a broader sense, of being and as a belief in the efficiency of this activity. The quintessence of the moral activity of the majority of world religions is rites, sacrifices, and rituals. According to Mircea Eliade, 'each sacrifice is a repetition of the act of World creation'. Both rites and rituals and everyday activity are used to make being meaningful. Religious persons pay attention to each word, thought and action of theirs as if considering their effect on their surroundings, world and being. The whole activity is pervaded with the belief of its efficiency.

The decline of the creative function of activity is particularly evident in a decreased participation in rituals and a weaker personal piety. Western people are often no more in the context of being and they increasingly refuse to participate in the creation of the sacred model of being. Their participation in religious ceremonies is rare

and their very participation is becoming formal. The orthodoxy of faith is weakening and the moral forgiveness in respect to the phenomena condemned by the Church is strengthening.

**A Decline in the Integrating Function of Morality.** Religion orients man to strive for union with the highest of possible beings, with Someone higher than whom, according to Anselm of Canterbury, *nothing more can be imagined*. In some religious and moral systems, union with nature is strived for. An apprehension of union with nature develops a sense of awe for life, a sense of the sacred and of self-denial. In other moral systems, man is seen first as a member of humanity. Humanity is considered the highest point in the moral framework of Kant's philosophy:

At some stage of his spiritual evolution, man experiences union with his nation. In this instance, the same social and political values consolidate people: fighting for the freedom of the nation or for a better life, etc.

The lowest form of unity, involving only a small group of people, is with the family. Precisely this type of unity plays the greatest role in contemporary society.

The importance of the family in Western societies is nevertheless declining. Thus, the number of people who share the opinion that "marriage is an out-dated institution" increased in most European countries in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (from 29% to 36% in France, from 14% to 18% in Germany, from 9% to 21% in Lithuania, and so on; see Inglehart and others, 2004, table D022).

The history of Western culture is a history of growth in human loneliness. Religion orients man to strive for union with God. Moral systems attempt to strengthen the union between man and nature or at least between man and all humankind. Social and political doctrines are meant for groups of people; thus, they make people more hostile toward one another rather than unite them. Family values involve a minimal number of people, but even the family appears to be an obstacle for many in their pursuit of personal goals. Obvious evidence of this fact is the constantly deepening crisis in the family.

**The Orienting Function of Morality: The Achieved Goal.**

In the preparatory stage of the study on European values, a representative British sample was asked the following question: "What values or goals of life do you think are the most worth striving for, either for yourself or society as whole? Please mention up to three."

The most frequently mentioned value was “happiness,” followed by references to family life, income (standard of living), and health. Other tests have yielded similar results. People living in Western Europe most often mention the following as conditions for happiness:

A satisfactory home life.

A good state of health.

Having enough money to live comfortably.

EVSSG research shows that an absolute majority of Europeans are happy. Thus, in Denmark 95% of the population is very happy or quite happy, in Sweden – 93%, and in France – 91%. Since having enough money to live comfortably is one of the basic conditions of happiness, it is natural that in the less wealthy countries of Eastern Europe these figures are lower: in Poland – 78%, in Lithuania – 76%, and in Estonia – 67%. There is no doubt that as the standard of living rises, the feeling of happiness in Eastern Europe will increase, too, and after a while will be the same as in Northern and Western Europe. Europe will become a solid region of happiness.

The entire history of humankind consists of creating and striving for certain goals. It is possible to strive for the kingdom of heaven, for moral perfection, for union with nature, for a truthful society, etc. None of these goals has ever been achieved, but the very process of striving has been the essence of spiritual evolution. The West has nothing left to strive for nowadays: happiness, which is the main value and goal, has been achieved. There is no goal; there is no evolution. *What we usually call life is just its embryo in germ*, - wrote Vivekananda.

**Traits of the Development of Western Ideology.** The crisis of Western ideology is attested in the first place by the growth of the number of ideologies and the degradation of their content. The crisis of Christianity, which started in the modern era, involved ideology as well. Initially Christian ideology was rejected as the only true one. The Church was separated from the state. Subsequently the number of ideologies increased. Parties were established; all of them had their own ideologies and claimed that they had the best plans for the reconstruction of society. Later ideologies were created by people united by common viewpoints, interests and dispositions – various hedonist lodges, beatniks, satanists, etc. The greater was the number of ideologies, the fewer were their adherents. The apex of ideological pluralism is when everyone is one’s own ideologist.

The contents of the ideologies degenerated with the growth of their number. Christian ideology had covered all theoretical and practical spheres of the people's life. Its influence waning, more and more areas of interest became de-ideologized. The ideologies of the present-day parties usually consist of most general empty non-committal statements.

**The Prospects of Development.** There are four main scenarios for the development of the relations between Islam and the West.

According to the first scenario, the conflict between the West and Islam will grow and develop into a global one leading ultimately to world catastrophe. In other words, leaving the world stage, God will take humanity with him. That would be the Apocalypse, a horrific picture of which is graphically described in the Revelation to John. Practically that would be possible when the nations of the Islamic world acquired weapons of mass destruction. Few would doubt that it would be possible sooner or later. If the West satisfied itself that the talks were the right decision, the result would be ineffective. If attempts were made to prevent the Moslem states from implementing their nuclear programmes as it was done in the case of Iraq, the response might be of such dimensions that the tragedies of New York or London would look like incessant jokes.

Under the second scenario, the whole world, including the Moslem states would eventually take over Western values and way of life. That is quite feasible since, according to some thinkers (and Fukuyama as well) these are not empty Western pretences – they correspond to the objective course of history. Though this process could be checked temporarily by some forces hostile to the West, the modernity, represented by the United States and other democracies will spread throughout the world.

The third scenario foresees the Islamization of the West. In the opinion of some thinkers, Islam is a synthetic religion, comprising the best traits of Christianity and Judaism. These theoretical deliberations are corroborated by facts: Islam is the only religion in the world, practiced by a permanently increasing number of followers. The West is also affected by this process. Samuel P. Huntington predicts that in 2005 Islam will be the most massive world religion (with 30 per cent people of the planet, and Christianity only with 25 per cent). That creates the conditions for the posters of the type *London is an Islamic City* to appear on the streets of this city.

According to the fourth and most possible scenario, the Western and Islamic cultures will change and transform into non-antagonistic ones. In both cultures certain changes are obligatory for them to develop peacefully. The main direction of these changes must be a rapprochement of the cultures. Practically that would mean some Westernization of Islam and a spiritual shift towards Islam in the West. Such changes are conceivable both theoretically and practically.

## LIFE OF THE FAMILY: EVALUATION AND REAL SITUATION

Keywords: Lithuania, globalization, family, marriage, divorce, fertility

In the chapter the family life and children having realities and relationships of their evaluations on the basis of corresponding statistical data (about the real situation and its changes) and European Values Study (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) data (about attitudes and evaluations) carried out in 1999-2001 are analysed.

Grouping countries into clusters according to their respondents' opinion about the most important *life values* similarities, we can find out, that the evaluations in Islam, West, post-socialistic and Latin America diverge significantly from evaluations of respondents in other countries. European countries are also distributed into some different clusters. It is characteristic to all the groups (in the world and Europe) that family is considered the most valuable phenomena.

Forms of living together are various and changing rapidly nowadays all over the world. Ignorance and *devaluing of marriage* as traditional official registration of living together is more widely observed.

The Western Europe countries, especially Franco culture ones: France, Luxemburg, Belgium as well as Latin American countries: Chile, Venezuela are those devaluing marriage most. But Europeans predominate in the group. On the contrary, respondents of Islamic and of deep religion traditions countries: Malta, Poland, Albania firmly believe that marriage is a must.

The opinion, that marriage is becoming obsolete are being realized practically: unregistered marriages or cohabitations are spreading widely. Cohabitations are popular (widely spread) in Denmark, France, Finland, Sweden, USA, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and Holland.

In the surveyed countries the view of marriage and *family stability* is rather diverse because of different influences, circumstances and the surrounding environments. In the countries of Western civilization where liberal economy and consumer culture predomi-

nates, the greatest threat to a family stability is widespread individualism tolerating different ways and styles of life. In Islam countries, where superficially families look most stable, one can more often see women's inequality, prevalence of forced marriages, which lead to break-ups. There are the least divorces in Latin America, the Balkans (both Muslim and Christian), Christian European (Italy, Ireland) and Islam countries.

Widespread of divorces is mainly conditioned by the factor of people's positive attitude towards them or the grade of justification. Among the most approving of divorces are West and North European countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Iceland), meanwhile other European countries such as Slovenia, Spain, France, Greece are a little bit behind. Japan is the only non-European country which joins the discussed ones. Only one European country – Malta falls into the group of ten countries that least approve the divorce. Among the latter countries Islam, African ones (Muslim Nigeria and Christian Uganda), Vietnam and China predominate.

In the group, which most tolerates and "puts into practice" divorces, predominate Scandinavian and post-socialist Middle and East European countries. Scandinavian countries on the whole treat the family life most liberally. Some post-socialist countries "are continuing" the previous high divorce rate.

During the recent decades significant changes have taken place in fertility and attitude towards *having children*. In many countries decline in fertility is noticeable, and therefore with the growth of extramarital births, children are less recognized as a value.

The total fertility rate (TFR) – the number of births per woman of child-bearing age, comparing 1970-1975 and 2000-2005 averages have ranged from 4.5 to 2.6, and in the countries of high income – from 2.2 to 1.7, of middle income – from 4.5 to 2.1, of low income – from 6.0 to 3.9. The TFR has mostly declined in the countries of East Asia and the Pacific correspondingly to 5.0 and 1.9 (in South Korea from 4.3 to 1.2), and have least declined in Sub-Saharan Africa (from 6.8 to 5.5). During the time the TFR has significantly declined, but remained high in the least developed countries (from 6.5 to 5.0), in Arab States (from 6.7 to 3.7) and in South Asia (from 5.6 to 3.2).

Changes in TFR are vividly different in Europe. Here rather low TFR has even more declined in many countries during the recent three decades. It has only slightly increased and remained average (1.7) in Finland.

The TFR was declining moderately on the European scale and remains rather low (1.3) in Lithuania. The similar situation has been recorded in Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Belarus, Slovenia and Italy.

In the developed West and North Europe countries the TFR was changing least and on the European-scale average ratio remained the highest during the recent thirty years.

The TFR was declining significantly, but remained relatively high in Ireland (it suddenly began to fall in 1985-1990), Albania and Turkey, where substantial declines as in Arab States after 2000 were experienced.

The TFR remained low because of the significant decline in such post-socialist countries as Moldova, Romania, Slovakia (where the TFR dropped significantly in 1990-1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the TFR was influenced by the war in Yugoslavia. Spain also belongs to the low level of TFR countries, where sharp decline began after 1975 when the Franco regime had been dismantled and Spain became a democratic state (and the second democratic transition could exist more freely).

The TFR remained low and was declining moderately in the countries supporting traditional family life and relatively conservative countries such as Germany and Austria (where a gradual decline of the TFR started in 70-ties), and in some countries of different type – Latvia, Croatia, Russia, where more significant fall was noticed after 1990, in some other post-socialist countries (where the TFR has fallen even more significantly).

In Europe the TFR change has been the least and remained the highest in the countries where extreme modern attitude towards family life and having children predominated. In the countries where the opinions of inhabitants on the questions had balanced between modern and traditional views, the TFR changes were more significant and approaching rather a low level. The greatest changes of the TFR (comparatively sharp declines to a rather low level) were fixed in the countries where opinion supporting a traditional family predominated. The greatest changes of the TFR was indicated in such countries as Albania and Turkey, where fundamentalist conservative view towards family life clearly predominated (similar processes were recorded in other non-European Islamic countries, precisely – in Arab States).

In spite of the fact that the fertility rates are dropping in the world, the number of *extramarital births* has risen considerably

(particularly in West and North Europe, North America). Comparing the proportion of the extramarital children with the view towards family and children having, one can denote some definite links.

Firstly, the greater proportion of extramarital children, the more the opinion that it is not necessary for a child to have both parents is approved. But the opinion is of minority – mostly approved in Sweden (by 40 %).

Secondly, the number of extramarital children correlates with divorce justifying: in the countries where there are the greatest number of such children, divorces are mostly justified.

Thirdly, mostly the opinion, that woman's with children life is more valuable, is more approved in the countries where there is smaller share of extramarital children.

## WORK AND LEISURE: A NEW SEARCH FOR A PERCEPTION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP

Keywords: work, leisure, Lithuania, postindustrial society

The concepts of work and leisure are closely related in sociological literature. In fact, sociology of leisure has originated as a branch of sociology of work, and the latter was based on the assumption that economic institutions create the nucleus of a society, and economic roles of individuals determine other their obligations and privileges. Out of this logic has arisen the perception of leisure as a secondary activity, a derivation of work, with its main function of physical rest and recreation. Such deterministic approach to leisure, however, is no more as pervasive as previously: nowadays leisure is granted the status of independent and significant dimension of life that has its autonomous meaning, but not the leftover of other, more important and rational, spheres of human life. There are several important aspects in this shift of the perception of leisure. First, leisure became to be treated not as empty time, free of significant activities, but as a time filled by valuable pastimes that create sovereign systems of meanings. Second, the autonomous value of leisure was acknowledged independent of professional work or any other context. Even though the attempts to negate the essential relation of leisure to work, family, and friends are rare, it is emphasized more and more often that leisure has much more diverse meanings than simply a remnant of other activities.

What is the "real" leisure, then? According to the description of famous researcher of leisure psychology John Neulinger (1974), leisure is an experience based on inner motivation and subjective feeling of freedom. Such a definition, however, is quite abstract to serve as a guideline for empirical division between professional and leisure activities. In this respect, much more tangible is Max Kaplan's (1960) conception of leisure that became a classical one. According to it, leisure is an antithesis to "work" as an economic function that is related to a pleasant expectation and recollection as well as to a psychological perception of freedom; leisure involves a minimum of involuntary social-role obligations and may range from inconse-

quence and insignificance to weightiness and importance often containing activities characterized by the element of play and having a close relation to values of the culture.

The ideas of different theoreticians about the sense and purpose of leisure activities are quite controversial. Even though the majority of them claim the rest after work and restoration of physical and psychological strengths necessary for tomorrow's work to be the main function of leisure, there exist other conceptions as well. According to rather hedonistic conception of leisure of French sociologist Joffre Dumazedier (1967, 1974), leisure should not necessarily be oriented toward any concrete aim as it simply allows a person to free oneself from the routine of everyday practices and ways of thinking. In Dumazedier's mind, apart of recreation, leisure also serves no less important functions of entertainment and personal development.

The psychological significance of leisure is emphasized even more by Roger C. Mannell and Douglas A. Kleiber, who list five psychological functions of leisure (Mannell, Kleiber 1997). The first is compensational function of leisure, which means that during the leisure time an individual is free to choose the activities related to the needs unanswered in other spheres of life. Second, leisure fosters personality growth providing an individual with the possibility to develop the variety of faculties, even those that are not employed at work, and to feel satisfaction with different kind of achievements. Third, leisure advances the formation of personal identity. Fourth, leisure has a positive influence for the psychological health of an individual helping to cope with various stressful situations. The fifth is hedonistic function of leisure: leisure is simply pleasurable. Therefore Mannell and Kleiber insist that leisure activities, even though relatively short and fragmentary, fill human life with meaning and grant psychological welfare of an individual.

Thus sociological and psychological literature is rich with the conceptions of leisure attempting to dissociate it from other spheres of life (first of all, from professional work) using the criteria of time, performed activities, and psychological states. To make the analysis of the concepts of work and leisure more systemized, several dichotomies of characteristic traits could be listed as most essential and helpful in theoretical division between these two spheres of human life. These are: obligation–freedom, anxiety–pleasure,

steadiness–fragmentariness, fatigue–repose, concentration–cheerfulness, orientation to the result–orientation to experience, stress–relaxation, outer motivation–inner motivation, etc. (see Table 1).

Table 1. Characteristic traits of work and leisure

	WORK	LEISURE
TIME	Stiffness	Flexibility
	Steadiness	Fragmentariness
ACTIVITY	Instrumentality	Self-sufficiency
	Outer motivation	Inner motivation
	Orientation to the result	Orientation to experience
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE	Obligation, restraint	Feeling of freedom
	Physical/psychological fatigue	Repose, recreation
	Concentration, effort	Playfulness, cheerfulness
	Anxiety	Pleasure, amusement
	Pressure, stress	Relaxation

Even though theoretical division between work and leisure seems to be quite simple and clear, the reality of human life is full of controversies and reservations that present practical research of work and leisure (concerning time budget as well as values and attitudes, etc.) with various conceptual riddles. For instance, one of the deepest convictions of leisure research was that leisure pastimes are related to personal choice rather than to compulsion. However, it appeared to be too obscure because: first, the majority of leisure activities are indeed linked to various obligations of an individual (related to professional activity, family roles, etc.); second, the very definition of an activity as “freely chosen” or “compulsory” heavily depends on subjective evaluation of a situation. Therefore the main focus of leisure research was shifted from activity to valuations and attitudes. Leisure started to be associated first of all with such psychological states as feeling of freedom, inner motivation, orientation to experience, etc. Such conceptual move, however, was not able to answer all questions that empirical research of leisure pose. No less problematic is the distinction of work and leisure using the dimension of concentration versus cheerfulness since certain degree of concentration is characteristic not only for work but for leisure

activities as well. Therefore the researchers of leisure even decided to divide between “casual” and “serious” leisure where the first is characterized by the fragmentariness and playfulness of activities and the second, by efforts, concentration, etc. (Stebbins 1982). All this proves that there are no absolute criteria for the conceptual distinction between work and leisure. The above-presented dichotomies may only be helpful as the guidelines for empirical research emphasizing those aspects of work and leisure activities that should be taken into account in every reasonable investigation in this field.

Even though work and leisure are two dimensions of human life that are inevitably intermingled, certain historical evolution of their relation could be observed. In traditional society, work and production was closely related not only to leisure but also to religion and politics – so that human life could hardly be differentiated into separate, more or less autonomous, spheres. The situation has changed quite significantly with the advance of modernity that was based on the assumption of protestant work ethics that work is the ultimate value, meanwhile leisure is valuable only as a restoration of physical and psychological strength necessary for the upcoming work. The differentiation between various spheres of human life became clearer; but at the same time professional work not only became the source of the means for subsistence but also an important determinant of all other activities of an individual. Important shifts are also observed in the transition from modern to postmodern societal condition when a new phenomenon of cultural devaluation of work comes to light. As Zygmunt Bauman (1998) notices in this respect, professional work ceases to be the source of the sense of life for an individual and the basis for the formation of personal identity. Rather, now it becomes important as a cause of pleasure and enjoyment. In this respect, work and leisure come closer again. But this statement is not equally applicable for the representatives of different professional groups. Empirical data show that highly qualified professional are more satisfied with their work since for them work is closely associated with certain values (Stebbins 2000). Therefore professional work as a central activity of life quite often is imported into the leisure activity of professionals to the degree when the dividing line between work and leisure becomes almost extinct. As a result, what we are observing in the Western world now is the radical change of the relation between social status and working hours.

If people of the highest social status used to spend the least time for their professional work and had the most prolonged leisure few decades ago, now the situation is quite the contrary.

Empirical research conducted in Western countries confirm theoretical assumption that the division between work and leisure becomes more complicated in the postindustrial society both due to the changing nature of work itself (which now is more about services than work at the assembly lines) as well as to the novel forms of organization of work based on contemporary high technologies. But are these insights applicable for Lithuanian society? Are Lithuanians starting to organize their life according to the schedule dictated by their leisure pursuits? Such guess seems hardly probable since in our society for the majority of its members work remains an economic necessity and the basis for everyday existence and, therefore, is highly valued. However, the conclusion that Lithuanian society is not advanced enough to enter the postmodern debate over the issues of work and leisure would be too hurried. Isn't it so that stories about unsuccessful search for a job and social exclusion of unemployed in everyday life discussions are replaced more and more often by the complaints about the shortage of free time? If some time ago such complaints could be heard from the lips of prospering businessman, nowadays they become more widespread. The question could be risen here if this phenomenon reflects the objective reduction of free time or rather the change of value preferences on the part of population. Trying to answer this question, we lean on empirical data of European Values Research conducted in Lithuania in 1990, 1999 and 2005.

The data show that during all surveys work was more important and valuable for Lithuanians than leisure. This finding is not surprising at all having in mind that similar evaluations are characteristic for the populations of the majority of European countries, and especially East European. In advanced Western societies, however, the tendency is observed that the importance of leisure is constantly growing, to the degree that it equalizes or even surpasses the importance of work. As our research data prove, similar process is taking place in Lithuania as well: importance of leisure has been slowly though constantly growing during the whole researched period. Meanwhile the importance of work was growing from 1990 to 1999 and has significantly decreased during the succeeding six years. Even though the shift in attitudes can not be assessed as revo-

lutionary, it discloses the tendency of increasing significance of leisure in people's life. This means that value shifts taking place in Lithuanian society follow similar direction as those occurring in economically advanced West European societies.

Here one importance notice should be made: shifts in the importance of work and leisure should not necessarily acquire contrary directions. Since leisure is often treated as certain leftover of paid and various unpaid work, there is a strong predisposition to treat work and leisure as alternative domains of life. Such perception, however, is too simplistic and runs against empirical evidence. As Lithuanian data demonstrate, in the period from 1990 to 1999 the increase was observed both in the importance of work and leisure. Thus work and leisure are not to be conceived of as two opposite poles on the value scale as their relation is much more complex and has a number of tints and nuances.

As discussed previously, leisure not necessarily should be easy and pleasurable meanwhile work can acquire some qualities characteristic for leisure (at least in some professions). Therefore any comprehensive study of shifting importance of work and leisure has to take into consideration which aspects of professional and leisure activities are emphasized by people as important at certain periods and trace the changes in these preferences. Analyzing the dynamics of the evaluation of the importance of various aspects of work among Lithuanians, the increasing importance of both some instrumental and "leisurely" qualities of work is witnessed. Probably the most suited example here is significantly and simultaneously heightened importance of good payment and job security, on the one hand, and opportunity to express oneself and use initiative at work as well as convenient working hours and interesting activity, on the other.

Quite obviously population is not homogeneous with respect to values and attitudes related to work. In Lithuania, the youth emphasizes the ultimate value of work less eagerly than older generations, meanwhile the ultimate value of leisure, much stronger. This tendency is especially noticeable among the youngest respondents (15–19 years old) for whom leisure is not only more important than for older people but also more valuable than work. This finding is not surprising at all keeping in mind that most people of this age are not engaged into the labor market yet and do not organize their life according to the rhythm of work. For those newly entering labor

market (20–29 years olds), the ultimate value of work significantly increases comparing to teenagers, however, they still value leisure more than older generations, even those approaching retirements. One can detect an interesting regularity of ultimate value of work and leisure for people of different age: the distribution of assessments of the significance of work clearly follow the logic of life cycle (i.e., people who have not joined the labor market yet or already left it emphasize the importance of work less than those still engaged in it); meanwhile the life cycle effect is not observable in the evaluations of the importance of leisure as the ultimate value of leisure decreases for every older generation.

Another important determinant of value judgements related to work and leisure is level of education of respondents. Here the major regularity observed is that more educated people tend to value higher both their work and leisure. One feasible explanation here could be that for more educated people both these spheres of activity are related to opportunities for self-expression and self-realization; but the regularity might also be related to the fact that more educated people have a general inclination for more positive assessment of issues related to the quality of their life.

As expected, attitudes related to work and leisure are also significantly differentiated among the groups of professional status. It turned out that managers and highly qualified specialists value both work and leisure more than the representatives of other professional groups do. Even though in all professional groups work was emphasized more strongly than leisure as an important dimension of human life, the discrepancy was the smallest among managers and specialists. Comparing the assessments of the importance of various aspects of work, it becomes clear that for managers and specialists the significance of interesting professional activity is more vital than for representatives of other professional groups. This finding confirms the previously formulated hypothesis that specialists who perceive professional work as a possibility for realization of their values have stronger expectations for work to be interesting and to provide with psychological satisfaction, thus – in a certain sense – to be “leisurely”. Also, managers and specialists more readily than the representatives of other professional groups agree with the statements that a person should work to fully express oneself and that people should not work if they do not want to; but at the same time they also evaluate more positively the decreasing importance of work in

human life. Thus, what is observed in Lithuania is certain degree of “convergence” of work and leisure (followed by the assimilation of values related to these spheres of life) for professionals, which is characteristic for other European societies as well.

The presented empirical data prove that Lithuanian society is going through fundamental and quite consecutive shifts in values related to work and leisure as vital dimensions of human life that are characteristic for postindustrial societies, and these shifts manifest themselves, first of all, as constantly growing importance of leisure and decreasing ultimate value of work trying to establish certain equilibrium between these two spheres. So far in Lithuania there was no research conducted going deeper into this problem and addressing specifically the issues of changing sense and content of work and leisure activities. If such changes are actually taking place, they are no less essential, since it might be the case that while the assessments of the importance of work and leisure are remaining more or less stable, the meanings attributed to these activities as well as their content would be changing essentially. For instance, work could acquire more “leisurely” features (such as flexibility of working hours and indetermination of place, feeling of freedom, inner motivation, pleasure, playfulness, etc.), meanwhile leisure activities could become more “serious”, goal-oriented and meaningful, requiring concentration and commitment. This indisputably would change not only the very nature of work and leisure but also the principles of the organization of human life in general.

TRUST: FROM THEORETICAL INTROSPECTION TO  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Keywords: Lithuania, trust, democracy, social capital

The goal of the article is to present notion of trust as a resource that enables and facilitates cooperation of people for mutual benefit. In order to reveal the role of trust in facilitating collective action of individuals and the mechanism of formation of trust the thorough analysis of reliance is given. The empirical part of the article is aimed at verifying theoretical insights about micro and macro-level factors that have influence on development of trust. For this purpose the data of European Value Survey of 1999 and data of representative survey of Lithuanian population using European Value Survey methodology conducted in 2005 by Public Opinion and Market Research Company "Baltic Surveys" at the order of Civil Society Institute are utilized.

In the first part of the article three questions are answered: What is trust? What functions does it perform? What factors determine the development of trust?

In the most general sense, trust is defined as an opinion about the actions of other people. It is a cognitive phenomenon: trust is based on an assessment of the probability that the actions of others will advance, or at least not harm, our interests. In the words of Piotr Sztompka, "trust is a bet on the future contingent actions of others" (1996: 39). The concept of trust is usually applied to the analysis of elementary, long-lasting, face-to-face human relations. However, in social life trust often takes different forms. People may trust not only people they personally know, but also institutions, organizations, individuals belonging to certain social categories. Thus, besides "personalized trust" (Stolle 1998), there could be distinguished "categorical trust" (Offe 1999), i.e. trust in some social categories of people, who are similar in their way of life, values or characteristics important in social life to the truster. In its turn, "personalized trust" and "categorical trust" are often referred as types of "particularistic trust" (Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994; Uslaner 1999; Patterson 1999).

On the other hand, in a society may prevail a more inclusive form of trust, when people trust not only those who are similar to

them but also most of people in their society. For reference to this form of trust, the term of “generalized trust” is used (Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994; Uslaner 1999). Finally, a distinctive form of trust is institutional trust; for example, trust in parliament, courts, educational institutions, private business companies, etc. It is crucial to stress that institutional trust is one of varieties of personal trust. Taking into consideration the variety of forms of trust, in the article an attempt is made to discuss the similarities and differences between developments of these forms of trust.

Interpersonal trust is based on history of interaction between individuals. Long-term, face-to-face relations provide an opportunity for individuals to form an opinion about each other’s trustworthiness. Sztompka (1999) indicates three criteria of evaluation of trustworthiness: reputation, performance and appearance. Hardin (1998) suggests that trust is based on knowledge about motivation of trustee to act in interests of truster. However, it is argued that the mechanism of interpersonal trust is not so simple: the very act of trust can motivate trustee to be trustworthy. Thus, long-lasting relations can be characterized not only by trust stemming from experience and knowledge but also by trust born of moral obligations (Offe 1999).

What are the functions of trust? By facilitating collective action, trust enables individuals to reach goals that require cooperation with others and that cannot be achieved without it. Trust is beneficial for participants in social interaction because it helps them save on resources needed for social control and thus reduces the costs of collective action (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; Sztompka 1996; Offe 1999; Uslaner 1999a). When an individual trusts, he/she does not need to spend time supervising and keeping check on the actions of others; he/she does not need to force others to provide one or another service, to perform one or another task for him/her; the individual does not need to buy insurance that others will behave in his/her interest. Trust is also desirable from the point of view of the one trusted because it is a sort of credit that creates more space for “nonconformity, innovation, originality or – to put it briefly – freedom of action” (Sztompka 1996 44).

However, as long as we focus only on personalized trust based on face-to-face relationships involving family, friends, and acquaintances, the radius of trust looks very small taking into regard the size of modern societies. This concept is not sufficient if we seek to un-

derstand the meaning of trust in contemporary social and political life. In modern societies the individual encounters strangers daily, and in these societies only a small part of the benefit that the individual derives is from strong personal social relations.

Some authors, such as Giddens (1990), Sztompka (1999), and Warren (1999a), stress that the problem of trust is particularly salient in modern societies. This fact can be explained by some of the unique characteristics of the contemporary world, some of which should be mentioned here for the sake of clarity. First, "the world in which we live is influenced to a growing extent by purposive human actions; societies are shaped and reshaped, history is made and remade (by charismatic leaders, legislators, social movements, political parties, governments, parliaments, innovators, discoverers, reformers, etc." (Sztompka 1999 11). Second, the processes of globalization increase the interdependence of people throughout the world, whether in the economy, politics, or culture. Third, modern societies are complex, and the well-being of the individual depends on many factors that he/she can neither understand nor control. Finally, in modern societies the well-being of the individual largely depends on impersonal and anonymous relations between people.

All the aspects mentioned above attest to the need to trust not only family members, friends, and acquaintances, whom we have known long enough to make experience-based judgments on their trustworthiness, but also, first of all, *strangers*. We speak about *generalized trust*, which can be understood as an optimistic attitude that most people have the same fundamental values as we do (Uslaner 1999a) or as "a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general" (Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994 139).

Generalized trust is what helps individuals lessen the complexity of modern societies and makes their relationship with the future easier (Giddens 1990, p. 83). By expanding social interaction between strangers in a society and making possible a higher density of interpersonal contacts, generalized trust facilitates communication and cooperation between people for their mutual benefit, promotes tolerance, the recognition of cultural and political differences, and makes possible the civilized resolution of social conflicts and the peaceful reconciliation of interests (Sztompka 1996; Misztal 1996; Putnam 1993; Warren 1999).

Given the importance of generalized trust, the next question which is answered in the article is: What factors determine the

formation of generalized trust? In social science literature a number of factors are identified: some of them are on an individual level, some on a societal level. The factors that are discussed facilitate not only generalized trust but interpersonal trust as well. However, in the case of trust between strangers, when there is no previous history of face-to-face interaction and the opportunities to control the one being trusted are limited, some of the societal factors discussed below are of crucial importance, particularly for generalized trust.

Defining factors on the individual level some authors notice that trust relations do not always depend on the rational calculations of the individual or the assessment of potential gain or loss. Sometimes trust is generated by an individual's *predisposition* to trust. It is believed that the predisposition to trust is developed during socialization in early childhood and may be established as a personality trait without necessarily being strengthened by positive experiences of reciprocity in later life (Uslaner 1999). However, it is more important to find out whether and how generalized trust may be learned in adulthood.

Putnam (1993) believes that the form of trust under discussion here is generated mainly by interaction between individuals in networks of civic engagement. According to this author, we learn to trust by communicating and cooperating with others in civic associations. Other authors (Foley & Edwards 1998; Wuthnow 2002; Delhey & Newton 2003) give priority to informal social networks (face-to-face interaction with family members, friends, and acquaintances) as a source of generalized trust. These informal social networks are important not only for teaching the "virtue of trust" but also for mitigating the risks involved in trusting strangers.

Another risk-reducing factor is the objective and subjective well-being of the individual. Misplaced trust in strangers may cause relatively larger losses for poor people than for rich members of society (Inglehart 1996, 2000; Newton 1999, 2001; Uslaner 1999; Dekker et al. 2003, Delhey & Newton 2003).

Nevertheless, many authors assign the most important role in the formation of generalized trust not to the factors mentioned above, but to institutions and legal norms (Levi 1996; Sztompka 1999; Offe 1999; Cohen 1999; Warren 1999b; Misztal 2001). The latter are important for the same reason as individual well-being and membership in social networks: they reduce the risks involved in trust. However, unlike the previously discussed factors, institutions and

legal norms can, to a considerably greater extent, create favorable conditions for the spread of generalized trust in society. If the rights of individuals are effectively protected by institutionalized norms and there are effective mechanisms to compensate damage, individuals will be more likely to trust others than in social contexts where no institutional means for cases of trust abuse are available or they are ineffective (Sztompka 1999; Warren 1999b; Hardin 1999; Offe 1999; Cohen 1999; Misztal 2001). Effective institutional order and a legal system mean that it is difficult to abuse the trust of others in order to advance one's own interests and to ignore the harm done to those who trust because such behavior will not remain unnoticed and unpunished.

The level of generalized trust in a given society is also influenced by such macro-level factors as economic development (Inglehart 1996, 2000; Sztompka 1999; Paul Dekker et al. 2003), the extent of social conflicts (Misztal 1996; Knack & Keefer 1997; Uslaner 1999), and the type of political system (Sztompka 1999; Uslaner 1999). Finally, the spread of generalized trust may be facilitated or inhibited by cultural context.

Interpersonal trust and generalized trust are referred as "social trust", which for analytical purposes is distinguished from "political trust". In the article, the scope of focus in the analysis of political trust is reduced only to trust in governmental institutions. As in a case of generalized trust, political trust largely depends on institutional order and legal norms. People can trust governmental institutions when they believe in power of law, when activity of institutions is regulated by clearly defined legal norms, and when public officials and civil servants are punished for abuse of these legal norms. Effective laws and mechanisms of their implementation help to reduce the risk of trusting governmental institutions (Cohen 1999, Offe 1999, Warren 1999b). In analysis of trust in governmental institutions some factors, that are not important for social trust, must be included. At the individual level it is subjective evaluation of effectiveness of activity of governmental institutions which in its turn is influenced by such factors as interest in politics, ideological dispositions, and attitudes towards politicians, well-being of individuals. At the macro-level, the level of trust in governmental institutions is determined by political and economic outcomes of political regime (implementation of civil and political rights of individuals and economic development of the country).

The theories briefly introduced allowed formulating several hypotheses that were verified during individual-level analysis of value survey of Lithuanian population of 2005:

H1: The social trust is more characteristic for the category of “winners”, i. e. people with high income, better-educated, having higher socio-economic status, happy in general and satisfied with their life.

H2: The social trust is more characteristic for people who participate in the activity of voluntary organizations.

H3: The generalised trust is more characteristic for people better integrated into informal social networks.

H4: The social trust is more characteristic for people who positively evaluate societal conditions of their country.

Another task of micro-level analysis of social trust was to identify relative importance of the above mentioned factors in explaining why some people trust others, meanwhile some others – do not. This task was accomplished by means of logistic regression.

Data analysis led to **the following conclusions:**

1. Individual level analysis of the data of value surveys confirms the hypotheses about the influence of individual well-being, belonging to informal networks and voluntary organizations, and evaluation of societal conditions in a country for social trust: as it turned out, social trust is more characteristic of people who a) have higher income and socio-economic status, are better educated, feel happy and satisfied with their lives, b) appreciate friends more and spend more time with them, c) belong to voluntary organizations and participate in their activity, and d) evaluate more positively the societal conditions in the country (as it is revealed by evaluation of the state of human rights in the society).

2. The results of the logistic regression of social trust about the relative importance of micro-level factors bring to the following conclusions: a) informal social networks are more significant sources of social trust than non-governmental organizations; b) social trust is influenced more by the subjective, not objective individual well-being.

The analysis of trust determinants at the individual level is completed by an attempt to delineate conceptual links among factors discussed. The author of the article concludes that all these factors are related to the feeling of individual security that could be understood, in the broadest sense, as physical, social, economic and

political security, and that is a prerequisite for social trust. This security is a composition factor that develops from interplay of other factors such as well-being of individual, his/her social integration, his/her perception of social environment and personal values that encourage him/her seek for independence and autonomy. Each of the mentioned factors is more or less shaped by macro-level forces: economic development of the country, efficiency of political system, level of social conflicts, prevailing cultural norms and values. Moving from individual to collective level of analysis there are opened new possibilities to look for the answer not only to the question why some individuals trust others do not, but also why level of social trust is higher in one societies and lower in another, what accounts for rises and falls of level of social trust in a certain periods of time.

Consequently, the third stage was devoted for the analysis of social trust at the aggregated level using data of European value survey of 1999. Here, largely due to the possibilities opened by the comparative perspective of European countries, an attempt was made to reveal the significance of macro level factors – economic development of a country and outcomes of political system functioning (degree of implementation of civil, political, social and economic rights of an individuals), the stability of normative orders, prevailing cultural values – for the level of generalised trust in a society. It is important to emphasise that in this work the use was made of the subjective perceptions of social environment in order to capture the influence macro-level factors.

The analysis of the data at the aggregated level has allowed formulating **third conclusion**:

3. The low level of social trust in Lithuanian society could be explained by the deficit of the sense of subjective well-being among the population, weak integration of the citizens into informal social networks, and the dominant negative assessment of societal conditions in the country (that is, the sense of physical and economic insecurity on the part of the majority of population). These factors, in their turn, are associated to the macro-level factors that limit the spread of social trust in the society to a certain degree: a) relatively low level of the economic development of the country does not guarantee the economic security of the majority of population, b) insufficiently effective institutions regulating human activity does not ensure the public security, c) the new political regime does not secure the implementation of social and economic human rights in

the country, d) the cultural heritage of communist regime does not encourage people to feel more responsible for their well-being, to participate more actively in civic activities solving the salient social problems in the country.

The course of the analysis of trust in governmental institutions resembles the one of social trust; however, they also differ in certain ways. Similarly to the first case, the analysis consists of several stages aimed at discovering micro and macro factors explaining trust in governmental institutions and its dynamics in Lithuanian society.

In the first stage the attention was concentrated the dynamics of trust in governmental institutions in 1990–2004. The data showed that in 1992 the level of trust in governmental institutions started dropping down. In the beginning the percent of people who do not trust governmental institutions only slightly exceeded the percent of those who trust, however, eventually distrust of Seimas and Government of Lithuania became an attitude of the majority of the population. It is argued in the article, that the 'credit of hope' that was at disposal of the government during revolutionary period was destroyed by undesirable consequences of the processes of institutionalization of the democracy and market economy in the country, namely, economic decline, deterioration of standard of living, social anomaly. The sudden decrease of trust in governmental institutions, that started in 1992, on the one hand, could be associated with widespread in the population disapproval of political, social and economic reforms implemented from above, on the other hand, by widespread cases of incompetence, selfishness, corruption of people in the power, that led to the formation of the negative image of governmental institutions in the society.

The second stage of the analysis of trust in governmental institutions went back to the individual-level data analysis aimed at identification of the factors explaining the present situation of trust in governmental institutions. Leaning on the data of *value survey of 2005*, four hypotheses were subjected to verification at this stage:

H1: Trust in governmental institutions is more characteristic of people who evaluate positively the effectiveness of the new political regime.

H2: Trust in governmental institutions is influenced by the ideological predispositions of population.

H3: Trust in governmental institutions is affected by general interest in politics of population.

H4: Trust in governmental institutions is more characteristic of people who belong to the category of “winners”, i. e. people with high income, better-educated, having higher socio-economic status, who are happy and satisfied with their life.

The constitutive part of this stage was the identification of the relative importance of the factors determining trust in governmental institutions by means of logistic regression.

This stage of analysis ended up in formulating **the forth conclusion** of the article:

4. Individual level binary analysis of the data of value survey of Lithuanian population in 2005 confirms the hypotheses about the dependence of trust in governmental institutions on personal well-being of individuals, their assessment of the effectiveness of the new political regime, as well as on their ideological attitudes (party preferences) and interest in politics. The results of the analysis of logistic regression substantiate the following conclusions: a) the trust in governmental institutions depends most significantly on the assessment of the effectiveness of the present political regime, b) subjective individual well-being is more conducive to the trust in governmental institutions than objective well-being, c) general interest in politics determines the attitudes of the population towards governmental institutions to a lesser degree than other factors.

In the last stage of the analysis of trust in governmental institutions the macro level factors – namely, political and economic outcomes of the regime – were considered. Likewise to the analysis of social trust, the comparative perspective of other European countries was applied for this purpose. This stage of data analysis provided the possibility to shed light on macro level factors behind the evaluation of efficiency of political regime which is crucial in explaining of trust in governmental institutions at the individual level.

LEO TOLSTOY ON THE PLACE OF CHRISTIANITY  
IN WESTERN SOCIETY

Keywords: Leo Tolstoy, the West, Christianity, religion, crisis

Unlike the majority of contemporary thinkers speaking about the crisis of religions, including Christianity, Leo Tolstoy considered that Christianity would still have to find its place in the West. Social and moral disasters striking the civilized world are a sort of labour pains of growth, of new world outlook and morality. In short, the writer's viewpoint on the spiritual growth of humanity and the place of Christianity in Western societies can be characterized as follows.

The life of humanity changes and advances, like the life of the individual, by stages, and every stage has a theory of life appropriate to it, which is inevitably absorbed by men. Those who do not absorb it consciously, absorb it unconsciously. It is the same with the changes in the beliefs of peoples and of all humanity as it is with the changes of belief of individuals. If the father of a family continues to be guided in his conduct by his childish conceptions of life, life becomes so difficult for him that he involuntarily seeks another philosophy and readily absorbs that which is appropriate to his age.

In Tolstoy's mind, that is just what is happening now to humanity at this time of transition from the pagan conception of life to the Christian. The socialized man of the present day is brought by experience of life itself to the necessity of abandoning the pagan conception of life, which is inappropriate to the present stage of humanity, and of submitting to the obligation of the Christian doctrines, the truths of which, however corrupt and misinterpreted, are still known to him, and alone offer him a solution of the contradictions surrounding him. If the requirements of the Christian doctrine seem strange and even alarming to the man of the social theory of life, no less strange, incomprehensible, and alarming to the savage of ancient times seemed the requirements of the social doctrine when it was not fully understood and could not be foreseen in its results.

People think today that the requirements of the Christian doctrine – of universal brotherhood, suppression of national distinctions, abolition of private property, and the strange injunction of

non-resistance to evil by force – demand what is impossible. But it was just the same thousands of years ago, with every social or even family duty, such as the duty of parents to support their children, of the young to maintain the old, of fidelity in marriage. Still more strange, and even unreasonable, seemed the state duties of submitting to the appointed authority, and paying taxes, and fighting in defense of the country, and so on. All such requirements seem simple, comprehensible, and natural to us today, and we see nothing mysterious or alarming in them. But three or five thousand years ago they seemed to require what was impossible.

The social conception of life served as the basis of religion because at the time when it was first presented to men it seemed to them absolutely incomprehensible, mystic, and supernatural. Now people understand the rational grounds for uniting men in families, communities, and states. But in antiquity the duties involved by such association were presented under cover of the supernatural and were confirmed by it.

The patriarchal religions exalted the family, the tribe, the nation. State religions deified emperors and states. In precisely the same way the Christian doctrine is presented to men of the social or heathen theory of life today, in the guise of a supernatural religion, though there is in reality nothing mysterious, mystic, or supernatural about it. It is simply the theory of life which is appropriate to the present degree of material development, the present stage of growth of humanity, and which must therefore inevitably be accepted.

Tolstoy supposes that the time will come – it is already coming – when the Christian principles of equality and fraternity, community of property, non-resistance of evil by force, will appear just as natural and simple as the principles of family or social life seem to us now. Humanity can no more go backward in its development than the individual man. Men have outlived the social, family, and state conceptions of life. Now they must go forward and assimilate the next and higher conception of life, which is what is now taking place. This change is brought about in two ways: consciously through spiritual causes, and unconsciously through material causes.

Just as the individual man very rarely changes his way of life at the dictates of his reason alone, but generally continues to live as before, in spite of the new interests and aims revealed to him by his reason, and only alters his way of living when it has become abso-

lutely opposed to his conscience, and consequently intolerable to him; so, too, humanity, long after it has learnt through its religions the new interests and aims of life, toward which it must strive, continues in the majority of its representatives to live as before, and is only brought to accept the new conception by finding it impossible to go on living its old life as before.

Though the need of a change of life is preached by the religious leaders and recognized and realized by the most intelligent men, the majority, in spite of their reverential attitude to their leaders, that is, their faith in their teaching, continue to be guided by the old theory of life in their present complex existence. As though the father of a family, knowing how he ought to behave at his age, should yet continue through habit and thoughtlessness to live in the same childish way as he did in boyhood.

According to Tolstoy, people are guided in economical, political, and international questions by the principles which were appropriate to men of three or five thousand years ago, though they are directly opposed to our conscience and the conditions of life in which we are placed today. The position of the Christian peoples in our days has remained just as cruel as it was in the times of paganism. In many respects, especially in the oppression of the masses, it has become even more cruel than it was in the days of paganism. But between the condition of men in ancient times and their condition in our days there is just the difference that we see in the world of vegetation between the last days of autumn and the first days of spring. In the autumn the external lifelessness in nature corresponds with its inward condition of death, while in the spring the external lifelessness is in sharp contrast with the internal state of reviving and passing into new forms of life.

In the same way the similarity between the ancient heathen life and the life of today is merely external: the inward condition of men in the times of heathenism was absolutely different from their inward condition at the present time. Then the outward condition of cruelty and of slavery was in complete harmony with the inner conscience of men, and every step in advance intensified this harmony; now the outward condition of cruelty and of slavery is completely contradictory to the Christian consciousness of men, and every step in advance only intensifies this contradiction.

In Tolstoy's view, every man of the present day with the Christian principles assimilated involuntarily in his conscience, finds

himself in precisely the position of a man asleep who dreams that he is obliged to do something which even in his dream he knows he ought not to do. He knows this in the depths of his conscience, and all the same he seems unable to change his position; he cannot stop and cease doing what he ought not to do. And just as in a dream, his position becoming more and more painful, at last reaches such a pitch of intensity that he begins sometimes to doubt the reality of what is passing and makes a moral effort to shake off the nightmare which is oppressing him. This is just the condition of the average man of our Christian society. He feels that all that he does himself and that is done around him is something absurd, hideous, impossible, and opposed to his conscience; he feels that his position is becoming more and more unendurable and reaching a crisis of intensity.

And as the man who is dreaming does not believe that what appears to him can be truly the reality and tries to wake up to the actual real world again, so the average man of modern days cannot in the bottom of his heart believe that the awful position in which he is placed and which is growing worse and worse can be the reality, and tries to wake up to a true, real life, as it exists in his conscience. And just as the dreamer need only make a moral effort and ask himself, "Isn't it a dream?" and the situation which seemed to him so hopeless will instantly disappear, and he will wake up to peaceful and happy reality, so the man of the modern world need only make a moral effort to doubt the reality presented to him by his own hypocrisy and the general hypocrisy around him, and to ask himself, "Isn't it all a delusion?" and he will at once, like the dreamer awakened, feel himself transported from an imaginary and dreadful world to the true, calm, and happy reality. And to do this a man need accomplish no great feats or exploits. He need only make a moral effort.

THE BOUNDARIES AND PERIPHERY OF RELIGION IN  
GLOBALIZATION

Keywords: frontier, globalization, religious pluralism, tolerance, ethnic, national and religious identity, otherness.

In this essay general attention spared to the problem of frontiers' demarcation in religious world out-look, when "religious becomes less religious, and secular less secular" (Karen Armstrong), the unification as spreading process of a variety of probable ways in God's comprehension, and parallel process of religious fundamentalism intensification. Religious pluralism as an illustration of the tendency ignoring and demarcation of borders, traditionally means: the diversity of religious movements within a particular geographical area, and the theory that there are more than one or more than two kinds of ultimate reality and/or truth; and that therefore more than one religion can be said to have the truth, even if their essential doctrines are mutually exclusive.

Religious pluralism refers to the theological attempts to overcome religious differences between different religions, as well as the attempts to overcome religious differences within different denominations of the same religion. Wider conclusion means that religious pluralists are not saying that all religions are the same or that all religions necessarily lead to the same place or that religious pluralism necessarily means universalism.

Pluralism with the presence of various national, religious and cultural traditions already eases the idea and situation of dominant uniform system of values which have ideological, legal, religious, ethnic purposes. In the conditions of globalization, religious and cultural pluralism objectively becomes this ground, which is the most favorable for the prosperity of the global social, cultural and moral tendencies. Religious and cultural pluralism is not only a system of various values, acting under banner of religions and culture in its various modifications, but also has the secular tendency.

In lieu of the old, already stereotypical, classical representations new ones emerged. In conditions of globalization religious pluralism is allocated with new characteristic features and forms of the display. The reasons of "new" religious pluralism have global

character - they result any more only by local, incidental changes, conflicts, wars and natural accidents, but consequence of an opportunity of massive migrations on the whole complex of the reasons and not only extreme. It is an integral result of a conscious migratory policy of the advanced democratic countries, gradual realization of fundamental human rights. The "new" pluralism has national-ethnic character, its religious displays are the most appreciable, but not always really reflect that deep process of differentiation which occurs already inside. There is also a new dominating model of mutual relations of national ethnic and religious minorities with a society of the majority.

Process of enculturation in a society of the majority, more often in a post-industrial society, occurs at a high level of globalization processes by adaptation to spheres of the language, the profession, civilization and urbanization. At a spiritual, valuable, cultural, religious levels and world outlook as a whole the aspiration to remain the carrier of those local values which the given ethnic group has left is kept and amplifies (distinctions between Germany, Sweden and the USA). In conditions of the advanced democracy and active process of protection, first of all the minority' human rights, the "new" religious pluralism already at once gives opportunities free faith, the tolerant relation practically to each traditional belief or a religious innovation of ethnic minority. Therefore any kind of religious extremism cannot be justified as aspiration to ratify the belief, as reaction to its infringement.

The major categories determining difference between modernity and postmodernity with reference to the problem of religion, is *the differentiation* and *dedifferentiation*. Author remarks two tendencies, forms and spheres of display in the New Europe: *dedifferentiation* or ignoring and demarcation of borders (a postmodernism, the beginning in a modern time) and *differentiation* or erection and worship borders (traditional communities, religious fundamentalism).

Forms and spheres of display of the first tendency are the following: disintegration of totalitarian empires and a reconstruction of the mononational (homogenous) states; intensification of ethnic, national and confessional borders, giving it the status of the highest value; amplification of religious fundamentalism as attempts to strengthen ethnically and religious traditional way of life, women functions and system of values. Occurrence of that in the scientific literature has received the name "frontier zone" or regional cultural

phenomena in which dichotomy «we” and “they” is dominating in public consciousness, and “ethnomythology” is determining spiritual stimulus of the future development and a basis of aspiration to designing new borders.

Forms and spheres of display of the second tendency: the wish «to rethink Europe», the aspiration to come off the past, creation of the overstates formations ignoring “old” borders on the economic, political and cultural levels, the integrated approach to scientific disciplines and development comparative method as universal in sciences about human being, rapprochement of identities and opportunities of their free choice on the basis of ignoring former borders and criteria, overcoming religious, confessional and denominative borders, occurrence of the interethnic, transnational religious organizations ignoring the state and national borders and the tendencies of ecumenism. Dialogue starts to be one of the most important ways to demark borders of hostility.

In the article found that situation of religious pluralism has a number of postmodern specific feature, such as development of humanistic ethics in close interrelation with a variety kinds of spirituality, the denomenalization as a process of free transition from one religious organization (church, denomination, movement, cults) to another, unification as spreading process of a variety of probable ways in God’s comprehension, destruction of borders between sacrum and profanum, maximal rapprochement with a cultural discourse, the refusal of regulation of religious sphere with cultural stresses to free choice. Religious postmodernism integrated with a wide cultural and sociological context. Postmodern approaches and concepts, which direct or indirectly concern the phenomenon of religion, are almost not connected with names of known theologians or researchers (with slight exceptions). More often religion’s deconstruction is connected with name of known postmodernists - culturologists, philosophers, linguists.

The deconstruction of religion means destruction of complete system representation as such, giving to religion irrational, fragmentary, inconsistent character. Nevertheless, it does not mean refusal of religion as such.

Author gives interpretation of such definitions as “identity” and “authenticity of ethnic and religious choice” (Slavoj Zizek). The problem of identity in the modern epoch consists in how to construct identity and to keep its integrity and stability. The prob-

lem of identity in the postmodern epoch is how to avoid fixing and to keep freedom of a choice. Such “emancipated” from identity person starts to search for Other in himself and finds Other, if not in himself personally, then in the processes occurring around him. The process of globalization has parallel tendency in which racial and ethnic self-identification start to be very important. Religious pluralism is a unique phenomenon in which all actors of this process are Others.

In this essay described three basic functions which are attributed to the religious factor in conditions global processes: an obstacle or alternative (« last identity shelter »); a niche (the religion remains neutral sphere which globalization mentions only in external forms of its display) and a camouflage, allowing distracting and using the religious factor in conditions of modern contradictions.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESERVATION  
OF THE VISUAL IMAGE OF THE TOWN  
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF GLOBALIZATION

Keywords: visual image of town, identity, preservation, high-rise development, high-rise buildings

Almost sixteen years since the restoration of its independence Lithuania has been reviewing the Law of Territory Planning and the regulations on the development of comprehensive urban plans and has been trying to reconsider the municipality priorities related to the issues of city development, to establish (more or less) transparent partnerships with the private sector, and to develop city respecting its unique identity features. This process concerns many aspects of the city (plotical, economical, social), but it relates mostly to the urban design issues that directly influence development of the city and its quality, preservation of visual identity, and hereby life of its citizens. The topical priorities of the municipality related to the city development issues include the need to protect the valuable territories of the city from precipitant and uncompromising intervention of the high-rise buildings and the intentions of their investors. It may be viewed as an outcome of globalization, when problems of city image, typical for the context of the city development process today, are taken over mechanically. Thus a typical problem of cities is the preservation of the visual identity in the city's central part, its fortification and the development of the general city image within the context of the increasing expansion of commercial interests into the historical parts of cities. A similar process is observed in many cities of Central Europe. Lithuania is no exception. The forceful establishment of the high-rise buildings in our cities since the beginning of the third millenium has necessitated search for new scientifically-grounded methods to regulate this process.

During the first decade of Lithuania's independence (since 1990) no dominant high-rise buildings have been constructed. The role of dominants has caused concern during a few last years, when the changing political-social conditions have determined the shift of ownership and the restitution of land. Inability to control private ownership and increasing scope of investments have caused uncon-

trolled spread of the high-rise buildings in the outskirts of the central part of the major cities and have significantly changed the layout-spatial character of the city structure.

After a rather long period of no developments both in Lithuania and in Vilnius, new high-rise buildings have become a real threat to the visual identity of the city, which has been shaped over more than one century. Therefore a new objectively-reasoned concept of sustainable development of the city was needed in order to preserve its identity.

Vilnius municipality undertook the implementation of this task in 2000. It commissioned a group of scholars from the Department of Urban Design (VGTU) to carry out a study "Development of the regulation of the built-up height in the central part of Vilnius city". The result of this extended research has been the establishment of the regulation principles of high-rise buildings, building-up height in blocks and a draft regulation as methodical guidelines for the task.

As the need to have a document regulating high-rise buildings was still clear, the rules on the development of the special plan for the location of high-rise buildings (Department of Urban Design, VGTU) were drawn up on the basis of the methodical guidelines of the above-mentioned study, and thereafter approved.

In 2005 the publishing office of Vilnius Gediminas Technical University published the monograph "Preservation of visual identity of the Vilnius City and principles of its development" by a group of scholars (Z. J. Daunora, S. Kirvaitienė, A. Vyšniūnas). If this work had not been published, the society would have probably not known that such kind of research has been carried out in the field of urban design and that scholars are concerned about cities, which are increasingly exposed to the impact of the globalization process. This article aims to present the above-mentioned monograph and to look into the issue of high-rise build-up in Lithuania and in the world.

The EU Commission has been pooling professionals of different fields for the project of the construction of the EU Chamber and organized regular discussions on a topical problem "Vision of European cities". It has frequently been emphasized "[...] priorities in promotion of cities identity, to preserve historical and cultural heritage" and has been proudly pointed out that "European cities differ from American, Australian and African ones due to their historic architecture, old-town complexes and variety".

The high-rise build-up in the structure of cities is neither a good nor a bad phenomenon; everything depends on the value scale in a certain place. High-rise building development is meant to protect the old core of the city in historical cities from build-up transformations, i.e. increasing density of the build-up structure. This view raises a task and states a problem – how to preserve the unique silhouettes of cities of the world from unifaction?